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QUESTIONING TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST
PRESUMPTIONS: PRICE AND NON-PRICE
COMPETITION IN HOSPITAL MARKETS
PeterJ. Hammer*
Hospital mergers challenge basic assumptions about the effects of market power in
the health care industry. Antitrust courts have struggled with claims that hospital
mergers may in fact reduce costs and lower prices. This Article assesses the validity
of these economic claims in the context of an industry that has undergone radical
transformations in recent years. The Article also explores how such arguments
should be treated as a matter of antitrust doctrine in an area of the law that relies
heavily on market share presumptions and rule-based decision making. The Article
contends that courts should employ a total welfare standard of merger review and
attempt to directly assess the value of non-price competition. The Article further ar-
gues that courts should avoid focusing exclusively on consumer surplus and
should reject hospital overtures to entertain a variety of non-economic justifica-
tions for merger.
INTRODUCTION
Hospital mergers raise challenges regarding the effects of mar-
ket power in the health care industry and the role of presumptions
in antitrust law. The first challenge concerns the relationship be-
tween market power and health care costs. In the 1980s, a
substantial body of empirical work was published, establishing a
strong and consistent correlation between competition and medi-
cal expenses.' These studies indicated that market power was
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.S. 1986, B.A. 1986, Con-
zaga University; J.D. 1990, University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. 1993, University of
Michigan.
1. See, e.g., MONICA NOETHER, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMPETITION AMONG
HOSPITALS (1987) [hereinafter NOETHER, COMPETITION] (examining the effect of competi-
tion on aggregate hospital expenses taken from 1977-78 Medicare Cost Reports and finding
that competition is associated with higher medical costs); Monica Noether, Competition
Among Hospitals, 7J. HEALTH ECON. 259 (1988) (same); PhilipJ. Held & Mark V. Pauly, Com-
petition and Efficiency in the End Stage Renal Disease Program, 2 J. HEALTH EcON. 95 (1983)
(examining the effects of competition in the provision of end stage renal dialysis using 1975
data and finding that market power is associated with higher profits, which the authors at-
tribute to the lower costs associated with reduced non-price competition); Paul L. Joskow,
The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital Bed Supply and the Reservation Quality of the
Hospital, 11 BELLJ. EcON. 421 (1980) (examining the effects of competition on a measure of
hospital capacity using 1979 data and finding that hospital competition is associated with
increased capacity, which is viewed as a proxy for non-price competition); James C.
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frequently associated with lower medical costs. The second chal-
lenge concerns the relationship between market power and the
prices of hospital services. Researchers such as William Lynk con-
tend that hospital mergers, particularly among nonprofit hospitals,
may produce lower post-merger prices.2 On the surface, these find-
ings contradict the predictions of standard economic theory-that
competition should lead to lower prices and greater productive
efficiency-and raise legitimate questions about the rigid applica-
tion of traditional presumptions to hospital mergers.3 Antitrust
Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA
3241 (1987) [hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competition] (employing 1982 data and modified
measures of market power and confirming their earlier findings that competition is associ-
ated with higher hospital expenses); James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, The Impact of
Hospital Market Structure on Patient Volume, Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care, 4J. HEALTH
ECON. 333 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Hospital Market Structure] (examining effects of
competition on hospital costs using 1972 data and finding that competition is associated with
higher hospital costs measured on a per-patient day and per-admission basis); George W.
Wilson &Joseph M.Jadlow, Competition, Profit Incentives, and Technical Efficiency in the Provision
of Nuclear Medicine Services, 13 BELLJ. EcON. 472 (1982) (estimating the effect of competition
on productive efficiency in the provision of nuclear medicine using 1973 data and finding
that competition is associated with productive inefficiency, a finding attributed to more
intense non-price competition). For reviews of this literature, see Frederic J. Entin et al.,
Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107,
153-67 (1994); Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital Competi-
tion and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
117, 123-29 (1994); Peter J. Hammer, Mergers, Market Power and Competition: An Eco-
nomic and Legal Evaluation of Hospital Mergers 22-27 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hammer, Mergers,
Market Power and Competition]. Many advocates of hospital mergers have been quick to
label these lower costs as "efficiencies." As will be seen, such a label is premature and fails to
acknowledge the important role of non-price competition in hospital markets.
2. See William J. L)k, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 437, 449-52 (1995) (examining the effect of market power and nonprofit status on
hospital pricing employing 1989 data from California and finding (1) that nonprofit hospi-
tals charge lower prices than for-profit hospitals, and (2) that the merger of two non-profit
hospitals may actually lower prices). While the connection between competition and higher
medical costs reflects a near consensus position of the literature in the 1980s, the hospitals'
price claims are much more controversial and have been challenged by other researchers.
See David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reas-
sessment of Lynk's Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH EcON. 87, 97 (1999) (critically evaluating Lynk's
1995 study, specifying a different model using the same underlying data, and concluding
that nonprofit mergers are not associated with lower prices); Emmett B. Keeler et al., The
Changing Effects of Competition on Nonprofit and For-Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH
ECON. 69, 78-80 (1999) (examining the effects of market power on hospital prices using
California data from 1986-94 and finding that market power is associated with higher prices
regardless of for- or nonprofit status, and that hospital markets became increasingly price-
competitive over the period being examined). But see William J. Lynk & Lynette R. Neu-
mann, Price and Profit, 18J. HEALTH EcoN. 99, 110 (1999) (responding to various criticisms
of Lynk's 1995 study and defending his testimony in the Butterworth merger case).
3. The presumption that market power produces anticompetitive effects constitutes
the galvanizing force behind section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and ac-
quisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
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lawyers and commentators almost immediately recognized the dif-
ficulties this evidence raised for antitrust policy. 4 The intervening
years have witnessed confusion in the case law, as courts have
struggled with these conflicting claims and have come to conclu-
sions that are often difficult to reconcile with traditional doctrine.
This Article has two objectives. The first objective is to untangle
the complicated web of issues surrounding hospital competition
and to provide a framework in which lawyers and judges can better
understand the empirical research and its implications for merger
analysis. The second objective is to use the provocative issues raised
by hospital mergers as a vehicle to explore more generally the role
that presumptions play in merger analysis. The economics of hos-
pital mergers directly challenge core antitrust beliefs: the belief
that competition will efficiently allocate resources along price and
non-price dimensions, and the belief that competition will lower
prices. The resolution of these issues will have implications for an-
titrust law that extend far beyond the health care field.
monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). In light of this presumption, judicial decision making
follows a fairly settled pattern: courts define economic markets, calculate concentration
ratios, infer the existence of market power from concentration ratios that are "sufficiently
high" and, finally, presume the existence of anticompetitive effects from a finding of market
power. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.1a, at 444-45, § 12.3d, at 464-66 (1994) (discussing the role of mar-
ket-share rules and presumptions in antitrust merger analysis). Judicial reliance upon
presumptions can be an effective means of decision making, but presumptions will yield
defensible results only if appropriate economic theories and empirical evidence support the
legal inferences.
4. See, e.g., William G. Kopit & Robert W. McCann, Toward a Definitive Antitrust Stan-
dard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 13J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 635, 645, 656 (1988) (noting
the results of economic research and advocating against the rigid application of traditional
antitrust standards to nonprofit hospital mergers); Carl J. Schramm & Steven C. Renn, Hos-
pital Mergers, Market Concentration and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 33 EMORY L. J. 869, 884
(1984) (noting the results of economic research and advocating against the application of
standard market-share rules to hospital mergers). The vigor with which critics challenge the
rigid application of antitrust rules to hospital mergers has not diminished over time. See
William G. Kopit, Can the Nonprofit Status of the Merging Facilities Change the Proper Analysis of a
Hospital Merger Under the Antitrust Laws?, in ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTHCARE FIELD 19-22
(American Health Lawyers Association ed., 1999) (discussing the economic testimony pre-
sented in Butterworth and calling for greater recognition of nonprofit status in assessing the
competitive effects of hospital mergers); William G. Kopit & Tanya B. Vanderbilt, Unique
Issues in the Analysis of Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 254, 256-57 (1996)
(citing the absence of a correlation between concentration and higher hospital prices and
calling upon antitrust courts to accommodate the unique aspects of nonprofit hospital
mergers).
5. Two district courts, for example, have openly challenged the usually unassailable
belief that market power leads to higher prices. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 1285, 1295-96 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd without op., 121 F.3d 708, reported infull, 1997-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F.
Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va.), afrd without op., 892 F.2d 1042, reported in full, 1989 WL 157282
(4th Cir. 1989)
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Part I examines hospital markets and contrasts the effects of
competition in what I term the "Old" and the "Emerging" Regimes.
In the Old Regime, hospitals compete almost exclusively along
non-price dimensions. Not surprisingly, competition in this setting
is associated with higher levels of non-price services, higher costs,
and not necessarily lower prices. The institutional structures of the
Emerging Regime, however, facilitate greater price-based competi-
tion. In such an environment, one would expect an allocatively
more efficient balance between price and non-price competition.
Antitrust analysis is complicated by the fact that enforcement
agencies are most likely to challenge mergers in markets that are
still mired in the Old Regime or that are on the cusp of transition.
Part II explores the role of presumptions in merger analysis. An-
titrust courts and the enforcement agencies rely heavily on rule-
based decision making. Some aspects of these presumptions are
rebuttable, other aspects are not. The basic beliefs that competitive
markets are allocatively efficient, and that market power is bad,
cast a long shadow over these rules. Defendants in hospital merger
cases, however, argue that market power may be desirable. These
claims test the boundaries of the types of arguments judges are
willing to entertain. Part II examines factors courts have identified
for use in rebutting market-share presumptions, addresses whether
the alleged benefits of market power can be balanced against ac-
knowledged anticompetitive effects, and contrasts a framework of
intra-economic balancing with a framework of extra-economic bal-
ancing.
Part III examines how courts and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have responded to hospitals' non-price competition claims.
It is conceivable that competition in the Old Regime misallocates
resources. Whether mergers should be used to effectuate a differ-
ent outcome, however, raises controversial issues about when, if
ever, antitrust courts should question the efficiency of markets.
The fact that there are clear winners and losers in the suppression
of non-price competition further complicates the analysis. Restrict-
ing non-price competition via merger will increase producer
surplus (profits) and decrease consumer surplus. Part III criticizes
the courts and the FTC for failing to recognize and balance these
conflicting effects and explores how the problem might be re-
solved under a total welfare standard of merger review.
Part IV explores how courts and the FTC have responded to
hospitals' price claims. Disputes on the price front are hotly con-
tested both as a matter of economic theory and empirical
[VOL. 32:4
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evidence.6 The FTC has flatly rejected the hospitals' price-related
contentions, but some district courts have been more receptive.
The Butterworth7 district court, for example, was persuaded that
market power controlled by nonprofit hospitals was not associated
with higher prices;8 that the community-based structure of the
merged hospitals' board would constrain any anticompetitive ef-
fects; 9  and that the hospitals had signed a "Community
Commitment Letter" promising not to increase prices. 10 As the But-
terworth factors suggest, the hospitals' price claims can be used both
as a forum to air economic arguments in favor of increased market
power, and as a shield to potentially mask consideration of a variety
of extra-economic objectives.
Part V examines the lessons from the hospital merger cases and
explores the extent to which the presumption that market power is
undesirable should be rebuttable. A conservative approach would
maintain a strong and irrefutable presumption concerning the ef-
fects of market power, but would invoke this presumption in a
6. In what has been called "Posner's lament," Judge Richard Posner terms
"regrettable" the absence of solid empirical evidence to guide judges in evaluating the com-
petitive implications of hospital mergers:
It is regrettable that antitrust cases are decided of the basis of theoretical guesses as to
what particular market-structure characteristics portend for competition, but to place
on the government an insuperable burden of proof is not the answer. We would like
to see more effort put into studying the actual effect of concentration on price in the
hospital industry as in other industries. If the government is right in these cases,
then, other things being equal, hospital prices should be higher in markets with
fewer hospitals. This is a studiable hypothesis, by modern methods of multivariate sta-
tistical analysis, and some studies have been conducted correlating prices and
concentration in the hospital industry. Unfortunately, this literature is at an early and
inconclusive stage, and the government is not required to await the maturation of the
relevant scholarship in order to establish a prima facie case.
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted).
While everyone can appreciate the importance of a better understanding of the empirical
effects of market structure in the health care industry, Posner fails to address whether and
how courts should consider such industry-specific information in light of antitrust laws'
categorical rules and market-share presumptions. For a discussion of the reaction of econo-
mists to Posner's characterization of the industrial organization and health care literature see
Harold Demsetz et al., Policy Adequacy of the Empirical Concentration-Price Studies: The Posner
Lament, 22 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 19 (1990); PaulJ. Feldstein et al., Concentration and
Price in the Hospital Industiy: Prices Are Lower in Competitive Markets, 22 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REv. 55 (1990).
7. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1295-96 (W.D. Mich. 1996),
affd without op., 121 F.3d 708, reported in full, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,863 (6th Cir.
1997).
8. See id. at 1295-96.
9. See id. at 1296-97.
10. See id. at 1298.
SUMMER 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
more self-conscious manner to better channel disputes out of the
courts and into the legislative process. The FTC and some district
courts have followed this model and have relied heavily upon mar-
ket-share rules to guide their decisions. A more progressive
alternative would treat the effect of market power as a contestable
issue of fact. This approach would permit courts to balance the po-
tential economic benefits of market power against acknowledged
anticompetitive consequences. To do so effectively, however,
courts would have to develop a better analytic framework for assess-
ing the total welfare effects of merger. Unfortunately, the courts
that have accepted hospital arguments in favor of increased market
power have done so without engaging in the necessary welfare
analysis and without maintaining a reasoned distinction between
economic and extra-economic arguments in favor of merger.
I. HOSPITAL COMPETITION: THE OLD
AND EMERGING REGIMES
This Part presents a simplified description of the structure and
operation of health care markets with the goal of better under-
standing hospital competition." Assessing hospital mergers
presents a dual challenge. Not only are medical markets different
from the types of manufacturing-based markets that have tradi-
tionally been the subject of antitrust scrutiny, but hospital markets
are also frequently different from one another. In the last fifteen
years, the health care industry has undergone fundamental
changes, but changes across markets have not been uniform. As a
11. For a discussion of the structure and organization of health care markets and insti-
tutions, see generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
(1982), and ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH (1989). For discussions of
health care economics, see generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcON. REV. 941 (1963);Joseph P. Newhouse, The Erosion of the Medical
Marketplace, 2 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1 (1981); Mark V.
Pauly, Is Medical Care Different? in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRES-
ENT AND FUTURE 19 (Warren Greenberg ed., 1978); Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different?:
Old Questions, New Answers, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: TEN YEARS LATER
5 (Warren Greenberg ed., 1988). For a critical assessment and evaluation of health care
markets, see generally Robert G. Evans, Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind
Market-Based Health Care Reform, in HEALTHY MARKETS: THE NEW COMPETITION IN MEDICAL
CARE 66 (Mark A. Peterson ed., 1998) [hereinafter HEALTHY MARKETS]; Martin Gaynor &
William B. Vogt, What Does Economics Have to Say About Health Policy Anyway? A Comment and
Corredion on Evans and Rice, in HEALTHY MARKETS, supra, at 110; Mark V. Pauly, Who Was That
Straw Man Anyway? A Comment on Evans and Rice, in HEALTHY MARKETS, supra, at 104; Thomas
Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Healh System We Want?, in HEALTHY MARKETS, supra, at 27.
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result, the dynamics of hospital competition in one market may be
very different from the dynamics of competition in another.
While hospitals are collectively constrained by market demand,
individual administrators are more concerned with the determi-
nants of hospital-specific demand. Actions that have a negligible
impact on market demand may have a significant effect on the
demand for a particular hospital's services. 2 The factors that influ-
ence hospital-specific demand include: price, the actual quality of
the services, the perceived quality of the services, contracts with
insurance companies and other third-party payors, and physician
affiliation. To the extent hospitals can improve profitability by al-
tering any of these factors, given appropriate assumptions about
competitor reactions, they will "compete" along all of these dimen-
sions.
The effects of price on hospital-specific demand are straightfor-
ward. Higher prices should decrease the quantity of services
demanded from a given supplier. Conversely, lower prices should
stimulate demand. The relative importance of price as a competi-
tive factor depends upon the price elasticity of hospital-specific
demand (the relative sensitivity of changes in demand to propor-
tionate changes in price). 3 The price elasticity of hospital-specific
demand will depend upon the extent of selective contracting by
third-party payors, the extent to which physicians control patient
decisions, and the types of consumer incentives used in prevailing
insurance contracts.
Quality considerations play an important role in a patient's se-
lection of a health care provider. Patients directly internalize the
benefits of quality searches and quality-based decisions. The role of
quality differentials in the selection among competing suppliers is
even greater if insurance arrangements do not force patients to
internalize some portion of the cost of making higher quality
choices. As a result, a hospital that increases the quality of its
12. The distinction between market and firm-specific demand is important because
the ability of firms to "steal" demand from competitors is the primary force motivating rent-
dissipating forms of non-price competition. See Held & Pauly, supra note 1, at 100-03. From
this perspective, the dynamics of hospital non-price rivalry are structurally similar to the
rivalry characteristic of the price-regulated airline industry in the 1970s. The provision of
non-price amenities by one airline probably had a negligible impact on the market demand
for airline services, but it may have substantially increased the firm-specific demand of the
airline in question, typically at the expense of its competitors. See generally LawrenceJ. White,
Quality Competition and Regulation: Evidence from the Airline Industry, in REGULATING THE
PRODUCT (R.E. Caves & MJ. Roberts eds., 1975); Lawrence J. White, Quality Variation When
Prices Are Regulated, 3 BELLJ. ECON. 425, 428-29 (1972).
13. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (1988) (defining
price elasticity of demand).
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services should enjoy increased firm-specific demand primarily at
the expense of lower quality suppliers. To the extent that patients
can accurately assess the quality of medical services, they respond
to "actual" quality differentials. Under conditions of imperfect in-
formation, patients respond to "perceived" quality differentials.
The latter are manifested in reputational assets that may or may
not correspond to real quality improvements.
Institutional aspects of medical markets add two other consid-
erations to the factors determining the level of hospital-specific
demand. Frequently, patients do not make the ultimate selection
of a hospital. Both third-party payors and physicians are potential
sources of medical demand. If patients select hospitals implicitly
through their choice of insurance, then the number of contracts a
hospital has with third-party payors will influence its demand. Al-
ternatively, if patients select hospitals implicitly through their
choices of physicians, then the level of hospital demand will largely
be determined by physician affiliation. Depending upon which re-
gime is in place, hospitals have incentives to compete with each
other for the loyalties of either physicians or third-party payors.
Competition for third-party payors (large employers and insurance
companies) is likely to take the form of price concessions (the
Emerging Regime), while competition for physicians likely results
in the provision of amenities that correspond to elements in physi-
cian utility functions (the Old Regime) .14
The effect that hospital mergers have upon price and non-price
competition will depend upon the prevailing institutional ar-
rangements. As suggested, it is useful to distinguish the effects of
merger in the "Old Regime" from the effects of merger in the
"Emerging Regime." Prior to 1980, practically all hospital markets
would have fallen within the Old Regime. Numerous reforms since
that time, both private and public, have fundamentally changed the
nature of hospital competition in most markets. Depending upon
the scope of reforms, any particular hospital market may lie some-
where along a continuum between "Old" and fully "Emerged." The
primary differences between these extremes concern the roles
played by physicians and third-party payors. The following is a highly
stylized description. In the Old Regime, third-party payors act in a
passive fashion, observe a cost-based, fee-for-service system for de-
termining reimbursement, and employ a community-wide standard
14. The institutional factors motivating non-price competition in the Old Regime have
been widely discussed in the health care literature. SeeJoskow, supra note 1, at 431-33; Rob-
inson & Luft, Competition, supra note 1, at 3241-42; Robinson & Luft, Hospital Market
Structure, supra note 1, at 334-35; Wilson &Jadlow, supra note 1, at 473.
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to determine the reasonableness of hospital charges. As a result,
hospital price competition is virtually non-existent and prices are
implicitly set at the community level. 5 In the Old Regime, physicians
play an active role as "patient brokers," largely controlling a patient's
selection of a hospital. Under these circumstances, non-price compe-
tition dominates hospital interaction as hospitals actively compete in
terms of quality and physician affiliation.
The transition from the Old to the Emerging Regime began
with increasing levels of activism on the part of third-party payors
(typically large employers). Active payors negotiate directly with
hospitals over the price and terms of patient treatment and enter
into selective contracts, potentially excluding some health care
providers entirely. Selective contracting allows third-party payors to
deliver guaranteed demand to participating hospitals in return for
price concessions. These contracts establish the important link be-
tween price and demand that is largely absent from the Old
Regime, increasing the price elasticity of firm-specific demand.
The physician's role as the patient's agent is exercised (if at all)
within choice constraints established by third-party payors. Increas-
ingly, the Emerging Regime also involves the combination of
insurers, physicians, and hospitals into integrated providers of the
financing and delivery of health care services. This phenomenon
can involve a tiered process, beginning with loose contractual af-
filiations between physicians, hospitals, and insurance companies,
and sometimes progressing towards complete integration of these
functions within a single economic entity or firm. 6 Today, it is rea-
sonable to view the degree of managed care penetration into a
given market as a proxy for assessing the vitality of the Old Regime
and the strength of the Emerging Regime.
The Old and Emerging Regimes correspond to very different
models of hospital competition. In the Old Regime, price competi-
tion is not a central concern and lower levels of economic
concentration are not necessarily associated with lower hospital
prices-unadjusted for differences in quality and other non-price
15. See Hammer, Mergers, Market Power and Competition, supra note 1, at 53-54.
16. The changes in health care markets reflect a fundamental redefinition of the types
of economic transactions that take place at the market level and those that are carried out
internally by a firm or business. As such, the transition from the Old to the Emerging Re-
gime can be understood as a Coasian transformation of the nature of the firm. See R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 390-98 (1937). For a discussion of changes
in the health care markets based on a theory of the firm perspective and an examination of
the implications that such changes have for antitrust reforms see Peter J. Hammer, Medical
Antitrust Reform: Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF
HEALTH CARE REFORM (Gregg Bloche ed., forthcoming 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Hammer Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm].
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attributes. Numerous market failures in the medical industry mute
the relationship between market power and price or, at a mini-
mum, so narrow the range separating "monopoly" and
"competitive" prices as to render the distinction statistically insig-
nificant. For example, economist Monica Noether conducted a
comprehensive cross-sectional examination of the effects of eco-
nomic concentration using pricing data from 1977-78 Medicare
Cost Reports. 7 The coefficients of variables reflecting the effect of
market power on hospital prices were not statistically significant. 1
Rather than indicating that market power is not exercised in hospi-
tal markets, the study suggests that the institutional arrangements
characteristic of the Old Regime so restrict price competition that
traditional market power is not necessary to charge supracompeti-
tive prices.
Restricting competition in one area, however, is like squeezing a
balloon. In the absence of price competition, competition in the
Old Regime occurs almost entirely in terms of non-price rivalry.' 9
Predictably, differences in market structure influence the nature
and extent of this non-price competition. Monopolists are rela-
tively immune from the need to compete along non-price
dimensions. Consequently, expenditures on quality attributes,
reputational assets, and physician loyalty are lower in concentrated
hospital markets than in markets with a significant number of
competitors. Again, this contention is consistent with the empirical
evidence. A review of studies employing pre-1983 data (data re-
flecting conditions largely characteristic of the Old Regime)
reveals a strong and consistent negative relationship between
measures of hospital cost and levels of economic concentration."
Competitive pressures do not disappear; instead they are chan-
neled along non-price dimensions. This facet of traditional health
care markets has a number of implications for the application of
antitrust laws to hospital mergers and the relationship between
market power and price in the Old Regime-implications that
have largely been neglected or misunderstood.
17. See NOETHER, COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 43.
18. See id. at 55.
19. George Stigler was among the first to formally model and discuss the symmetries
between price and non-price competition. See George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competi-
tion, 76 J. POL. EcON. 149, 150-52 (1968); see also Peter J. Hammer, Price and Quality
Competition in Health Care Markets: The Comparative Institutional Case Against an Antitrust Exemp-
tion for Medical Self Regulatory Entities, in ACHIEVING QUALITY IN MANAGED CARE: THE ROLE
OF LAW 123, 131 (John D. Blum ed., 1997) [hereinafter Hammer, Price and Quality Competi-
tion] (applying Stigler's analysis to medical markets).
20. See sources cited supra note 1.
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The important economic question in the Old Regime is whether
the degree of non-price competition that takes place is socially de-
sirable. It is plausible to describe hospital non-price competition in
terms of a rent dissipating story-the so-called "medical arms
race." 21 If this is the case, then society might be better off with
lower aggregate levels of non-price competition. The issue is com-
plicated by the fact that there are clear distributional winners and
losers when market power is used to decrease non-price competi-
tion: producer surplus (hospital profit) is increased, while
consumer surplus is decreased.2 This leads to a difficult question
for antitrust law. Can (or should) courts consider arguments in
favor of merger that are premised on the alleged benefits of mar-
ket power, such as systematic reductions in wasteful non-price
competition? If such arguments are entertained, should courts
employ a total welfare standard or a consumer surplus standard of
merger review in deciding which increases in market power to
permit and which to prohibit?
2 3
These same issues are not raised in the Emerging Regime. While
some courts and commentators have purported to find lower hos-
pital prices in markets with higher levels of economic
concentration,24 the Emerging Regime sustains the prospect of ac-
25tive price competition between hospitals. Moreover, in markets
where meaningful price competition takes place in tandem with
active non-price competition, the rent dissipating story characteris-
tic of the Old Regime is substantially less credible. The levels of
market investment in non-price attributes in the Emerging Regime
are more likely to reflect actual consumer preferences (or at least
21. See David Dranove et al., Is Hospital Competition Wasteful?, 23 RAND J. ECON. 247,
257-60 (1992) (discussing the medical arms race scenario).
22. The welfare effects of merger can be broken down into the impact of merger on
producer and consumer surplus. "Producer surplus" can be equated with hospital profits.
"Consumer surplus" represents the difference between how much an individual would be
willing to pay for a product or service and how much the individual actually pays. See HAL R.
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 243-45 (1987) (defining
consumer surplus). Loosely speaking, consumer surplus can be graphically represented by,
the area under a market demand curve and the line representing the market price. "Total
welfare" is simply the sum of producer and consumer surplus. For further discussions of
producer and consumer surplus, see infra Part III.A. For further technical discussions of
consumer surplus, see generally FRANK CAMM, CONSUMER SURPLUS, DEMAND FUNCTIONS,
AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1983).
23. A total welfare standard of merger review would permit any merger that increased
total welfare, independent of the effect of merger on consumer surplus. A consumer surplus
standard of merger review would prohibit a merger unless the parties demonstrated an in-
crease in consumer surplus. For further discussion of the total welfare and consumer surplus
standard, see infra Part III.D.
24. See sources cited supra note 2.
25. See studies cited infra note 98.
SUMMER 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the preferences of consumers as aggregated by employers and
other large third-party payors), justifying the traditional antitrust
belief in the allocative efficiency of free markets.2 6 The Emerging
Regime raises important questions about the appropriate antitrust
policy for markets undergoing transition. Antitrust decisions affect-
ing the structure of hospital markets today will influence whether
and to what extent the promise of the Emerging Regime can be
realized tomorrow. Permitting increases in hospital concentration,
in a misguided effort to temper by-gone incentives for non-price
rivalry, could pose a serious risk to the competitive structure of
medical markets.
27
II. THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTIONS IN MERGER ANALYSIS
A. The Rebuttability of the Philadelphia Market-Share Rule
Antitrust laws apply broadly to all sectors of the economy. Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where
the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly."2 Throughout the 1960s the Supreme Court
engaged in a series of hit or miss attempts to translate this legisla-
tive mandate into a set of judicially administrable rules and
presumptions. The objective was to design a workable process for
determining which mergers would "substantially lessen competi-
26. See Hammer, Price and Quality Competition, supra note 19, at 133-34.
[T]o the extent that market outcomes in managed care markets reflect the actual
choices of consumers between different price/quality combinations, the presumption
that the level of quality provided by market forces is efficient (the basic assumption
made by antitrust law) has a primajacie validity that it lacked in traditional health care
markets.
Id.
27. This risk is compounded by the fact that producers have strong private incentives
to impose capacity constraints when faced with the prospect of active price competition. See
Hammer, Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm, supra note 16, at 37-40
(examining the pro-competitive virtues of "excess" capacity and the countervailing incen-
tives that market participants have to establish capacity constraints). At the same time, there
is a potential tradeoff between efficiency considerations and the structural intensity of price
competition. Preserving capacity on the market is not cosdess, but from a policy perspective
it may be worthwhile to purchase greater levels of competition through the preservation of
excess capacity, even at the price of some degree of inefficiency. See id. at 40-41 (arguing
that the pro-competitive virtues of excess capacity should be balanced against the inefficien-
cies associated with underutilized physical capacity).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
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tion" and which would not. The result, as announced in Philadel-
phia National Bank, was a presumption inferring the existence of
anticompetitive effects from a finding of economic concentration:29
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that mar-
ket, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticom-
petitive effects.
3 0
This approach left a number of questions unanswered. What
threshold of economic concentration triggers the presumption of
anticompetitive effects? Can the presumption be rebutted? If so,
are the factual issues concerning the existence of market power
and the theoretical inference of anticompetitive effects equally as-
sailable? What type of evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the
effect of a merger will not be to "substantially lessen competition"?
Some of these questions were answered in United States v. General
Dynamics.3' The central issue was whether the statistical evidence
introduced by the government was sufficient to demonstrate the
29. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). Philadel-
phia National Bank marked a departure from the multi-factored analysis the Court outlined
earlier in Brown Shoe:
Subsequent to the adoption of the 1950 amendments, both the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the courts have, in light of Congress' expressed intent, recognized the
relevance and importance of economic data that places any given merger under con-
sideration within an industry framework almost inevitably unique in every case.
Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the industry leaders and
the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary index of market power; but only
a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history and probable
'uture---can provide the appropriate setting forjudging the probable anticompetitive
effect of the merger.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962). As part of this broad-
reaching inquiry, Brown Shoe identified a number of different factors that should be consid-
ered, including the degree of existing concentration in the market, trends toward increasing
concentration, foreclosure of buyers within the market, and the ease or difficulty of new
entry into the market. See id. at 322. In Philadelphia National Bank, the Court consciously
adopted a more rule-based approach to section 7, establishing a presumption of illegality
based on market-share. The Court reasoned that "unless businessmen can assess the legal
consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded."
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362. The Court cautioned that it must "be alert to the
danger of subverting congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic investiga-
tion." Id.
30. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
31. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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existence of market power. Market power is ordinarily inferred
from market-share. In General Dynamics, however, the Court held
that past market performance was not necessarily an indication of
future market power. "Evidence of past production does not, as a
matter of logic, necessarily give a proper picture of a company's
future ability to compete. ,3 The Court reasoned that the best indi-
cation of future market power in the coal industry was
uncommitted reserves. Finding that the merged party would have
low uncommitted reserves, the Court held that the merger would
not create market power, and thus there would be no anticompeti-
tive effects. General Dynamics might be read to support the
proposition that courts are willing to go behind the Philadelphia
presumption. s In reality, the inroads of General Dynamics are much
narrower. General Dynamics only signified a willingness to treat the
existence of market power as a factual issue properly open for dis-
pute. What is important is that the Court did not question the
theoretical inferences that would have been appropriate if a
proper demonstration of market power had been made. 34
32. Id. at 501.
33. For an extensive discussion of General Dynamics and an examination of how lower
courts have reacted to the decision, see Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. FrC, 652 F.2d
1324, 1335-40 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit rejected the FTC's narrow interpretation
of General Dynamics and concluded that the decision signified a new willingness to permit
economic evidence to rebut Philadelphia's market-share-based presumption:
The error in the Commission's approach to GeneralDynamics lies in the Commission's
attempt to derive principles from the government's erroneous statistical measure-
ment of market concentration in the coal industry, rather than rejecting that
discredited analysis and accepting the rule that persuasive economic evidence can
rebut a prima facie case bottomed on statistics of market share and concentration.
Id. at 1340. Other courts have viewed General Dynamics as an attempt to refine, but not to
substantially alter the rule-based approach outlined in Philadelphia:
Rather, we view GeneralDynamics as standing for the unremarkable proposition that a
defendant may rebut the government's prima facie case by showing that the govern-
ment's market share statistics overstate the acquired firm's ability to compete in the
future and that, discounting the acquired firm's market-share to take this into ac-
count, the merger would not substantially lessen competition.
FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 1991).
34. A number of questions remained unresolved in the wake of General Dynamics. To
what extent did General Dynamics bring back the multifactored inquiry of Brown Shoe? To
what extent should the General Dynamics factors capable of rebutting the Philadelphia pre-
sumption retain the characteristics of categorical, rule-based decision making? To what
extent does General Dynamics permit or require courts to entertain direct evidence of the
anticipated effects of market power in a particular industry? An extreme interpretation of
General Dynamics would reduce the Philadelphia presumption to a mere burden-shifting rule.
Evidence of high levels of economic concentration would shift the burden from the plaintiff
to the defendants to demonstrate the absence of anticompetitive effects. In rebutting the
[VOL. 32:4
Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions
While the Supreme Court has taken a noticeable hiatus from
section 7 jurisprudence, the lower courts and the enforcement
agencies have continued to refine the process of merger analysis. s5
Courts increasingly speak in terms of market-share data creating a
presumption of illegality, or as establishing a prima facie section 7
violation.a6 Judges then stress the rebuttable nature of this
presumption, defendants would be entitled to engage in a broad, multi-factored inquiry,
including the introduction of direct evidence as to the effect of market power. A more con-
servative approach would retain the categorical, rule-based structure of Philadelphia within
the defendants' rebuttal case. High levels of market-share would support a presumption of
anticompetitive effects that would shift the burden to defendants, but defendants would
only be able to invoke structural economic considerations, such as the likelihood of entry, in
rebutting the presumption. The conservative approach would limit the type of factors that
could be considered under General Dynamics, and would potentially bar the introduction of
direct evidence of the effects of market power in a given industry.
35. Government merger analysis under the Philadelphia formula is fairly straight for-
ward: the enforcement agencies define the relevant market, calculate market-share, and
prosecute those cases where they can establish a high level of post-merger economic concen-
tration and a substantial increase in concentration levels attributable to the merger. See
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § I (U.S. Dep't of'Justice & U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Apr.
2, 1992), reprinted in 4 Trade. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (1998) [hereinafter 1992 Guide-
lines]. Proof of a sufficiently high level of economic concentration establishes a presumption
that the merged party will have market power, which in turn supports a presumption of
anticompetitive effects. Defendants typically respond by attacking the government's defini-
tion of the market and by trying to "rebut" the presumption that economic concentration is
persuasive evidence of market power by demonstrating that either no market power exists,
or that market power cannot be successfully exercised.
In evaluating the merger between the two largest hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan,
the Butterworth district court choreographed the process as follows:
The FTC may make a prima facie case by showing statistically that the proposed
merger would produce an entity controlling an undue percentage share of the rele-
vant market, and would result in a significant increase in concentration of power in
that market. Establishment of this prima facie case creates a presumption of illegality
which defendant hospitals may rebut through evidence undermining the predictive
value of the FTC's statistics. If defendant hospitals successfully rebut the presump-
tion, the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to
the FTC, which retains the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times.
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Mich. 1996), afFd without
op., 121 F.3d 708, reported infull, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
36. See Community Publishers, Inc. v. D.R. Partners, 139 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir.
1998) ("These high combined market shares of Stephens newspapers clearly raised a pre-
sumption that the acquisition violated Section 7."); University Health, 938 F.2d at 1218
(finding high levels of economic concentration trigger a presumption of illegality, creating a
prima facie case under section 7); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52
(D.D.C. 1998) (stating that market-share data establishes a prima facie case); FTC v. Tenet
Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946 (E.D. Mo. 1998) ("The merger of Lucy Lee and
DRMC is presumptively illegal under this test because the merged entity would acquire 84%
of the relevant market."), rev'd, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the FTC's definition
of the relevant market); United States v. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 136
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Generally, a plaintiff in a Section 7 Clayton Act antitrust matter may
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presumption, frequently characterizing this rebuttability in
broad and far-reaching terms.3 ' To phrase the central issue in
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that the merged entity will have a large per-
centage of the 'relevant market,' so that it may raise prices above competitive levels."); FTC
v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1083 (D.D.C. 1997) ("By showing that the proposed
transaction between Staples and Office Depot will lead to undue concentration in the mar-
ket for consumable office supplies sold by office superstores in the geographic markets
agreed upon by the parties, the Commission establishes a presumption that the transaction
will substantially lessen competition."); Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294 ("A transaction
resulting in a high concentration of market power and creating, enhancing, or facilitating a
potential that such market power could be exercised in anticompetitive ways is presump-
tively unlawful."); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Iowa
1995) ("The government may make a prima facie showing that the merger will result in
anticompetitive effects by showing that the merged entity will have an undue share of the
relevant market."), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (remanding to district
court with instructions to dismiss as moot because the parties abandoned their intentions to
merge); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Del. 1991) ("If it
demonstrates that the merger further consolidates an already highly concentrated market
for a given product, the Government establishes a rebuttable presumption that the merger is
illegal under Section 7."); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 678
(D. Minn. 1990) ("The Court finds that if the government established that the MSP/MSA is
the relevant geographic market, then, under Philadelphia National Bank it would be entitled
to a presumption of a prima facie violation of Section 7."); FTC v. Promodes S.A., 1989-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,688, at 61,626 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("This high market concentration
raises a presumption of illegality under Section 7 of the Clayton Act."); California v. Ameri-
can Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 1988) ("Statistical evidence of market
share and concentration resulting from a merger can establish a prima facie case or the
presumption that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition in violation
of the Clayton Act."), af"d in part and rev'd in part, 872 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Statistics that indicate excessive post-merger market share and market concentration cre-
ate a presumption that the merger violates the Clayton Act."), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
37. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1218 (holding that the presumption is rebuttable);
R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 110 (2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that "market
share data that does not accurately reflect probable market power may not be relied upon to
invalidate a merger"); Kaiser Aluminum, 652 F.2d at 1341 ("Nonstatistical evidence which
casts doubt on the persuasive quality of the statistics to predict future anticompetitive conse-
quences may be offered to rebut the prima facie case made out by the statistics."); Cardinal
Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (finding rebuttal of the prima facie case); Staples, 970 F. Supp. at
1083 ("Once such a presumption has been established, the burden of producing evidence to
rebut the presumption shifts to the defendants. To meet this burden, the defendants must
show that the market-share statistics give an inaccurate prediction of the proposed acquisi-
tion's probable effect on competition.") (citations omitted); Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294
("In order to prevent injunctive relief, defendants must rebut this prima facie case by show-
ing under the facts of this case, notwithstanding the statistical evidence, that the proposed
merger is not likely to result in anticompetitive effects."); Mercy Health, 902 F. Supp. at 976
("If the government is able to make a prima facie case, the defendants can overcome the
presumption of illegality by showing that the market-share analysis gives an inaccurate re-
flection of the acquisition's probable effect on competition within the relevant market.");
United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D.D.C. 1993) ("Defendants, however,
may-and in this case, do-rebut [the Philadelphia] presumption."); United Tote, 768 F. Supp.
at 1070 ("Accordingly, United Tote may successfully rebut the Government's statistical case
by affirmatively showing that the merger between itself and Autotote is unlikely to substan-
tially lessen competition or by discrediting the data underlying the Government's prima
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section 7 analysis in terms of a rebuttable presumption of ille-
gality invites merging defendants to aggressively explore means
of overcoming this presumption and countering the govern-
ment's prima facie case. The list of factors potentially capable of
rebutting the market-share-based presumption is lengthy and
growing.8  The factors include: (1) ease of entry, 9  (2)
facie case."); Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 674 (stating that "this high concentration
warrants a presumption that a prima facie violation of Section 7 has been established, unless
defendants present clear evidence that the proposed acquisition is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects"); Promodes, 1989-2 Trade Cas. at 61,626 ("Nevertheless, a high mar-
ket share does not establish a per se violation of Section 7. Market share data that does not
accurately reflect probable market power may not be relied upon to invalidate a merger.")
(citations omitted); American Stores, 697 F. Supp. at 1128 ("The presumption of a Clayton Act
violation based on the post-merger market statistics is not conclusive and can be overcome,
but only by a showing that the statistics do not accurately reflect the probable effect of the
proposed merger on competition."), affd, 872 F.2d at 843 (holding that the presumption
can be rebutted by evidence demonstrating that market-share data inaccurately portrays the
merger's probable effect on competition).
38. Many of the considerations relevant to the inquiry are similar to those identified in
Brown Shoe. See Kaiser Aluminum, 652 F.2d at 1341.
Among the factors to be considered might be ease of entry into the market, the trend
of the market either toward or away from concentration, and the continuation of ac-
tive price competition. In some cases unique economic circumstances might make
other factors significant, e.g., the genuine independence of the acquired com-
pany.., or the merger of two small firms to survive competitively in a market, or the
demand of a market for large producers.
Id; see also Remington Prod., Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 717 F. Supp. 36, 44 (D. Conn.
1989) ("Although market shares are the 'primary indicia of market power' courts may view
other economic and historical factors. These factors may include: (1) concentration in the
industry; (2) ease of entry into the market; (3) strength of remaining firms; (4) supply and
demand in the market; and (5) post-acquisition events.") (citations omitted).
39. See Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 55 ("A court's finding that there exists ease of
entry into the relevant product market can be sufficient to offset the government's prima
facie case of anti-competitiveness."); Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1086.
If the defendants' evidence regarding entry showed that the Commission's market-share
statistics give an incorrect prediction of the proposed acquisition's probable effect on
competition because entry into the market would likely avert any anti-competitive effect
by acting as a constraint on Staples-Office Depot's prices, the Court would deny the
FTC's motion. The Court, however, cannot make such a finding in this case.
Id.; see also Community Publishers, 139 F.3d at 1184 ("Further, the court found that NAT and
Donrey had failed to rebut the presumption of illegality. In particular, the court found that
barriers to entry are formidable in the local daily newspaper business ... ."); Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 149 ("A merger is not likely to cause an anti-competitive
effect if other participants can enter the relevant markets and reduce the likelihood of a
price increase above competitive levels."); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1223
(W.D. Mo.) ("In assessing competitive effects, the Court must also evaluate the possibility
and likelihood of new competitors entering the relevant geographic market."), affd, 69 F.3d
260 (8th Cir. 1995); United Tote, 768 F. Supp. at 1071 ("United Tote's second argument is
that it is so easy to enter the totalistor market that high market share does not accurately
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efficiency, 4° (3) "flailing company" or weak competitor status,'
(4) the presence of large sophisticated buyers,42 (5) nonprofit
reflect an ability to exercise market power."); Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 679 ("First,
defendants assert that low entry barriers exist, making it unlikely that a price increase could
be sustained because new competitors would enter the market and offer lower prices.");
Promodes, 1989-2 Trade Cas. at 61,626 (implying that evidence of likely entry is sufficient to
rebut presumption of anticompetitive effects); American Stores, 697 F. Supp. at 1131-32
(considering and rejecting defendant's entry argument); McCaw Personal Communications,
Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The existence of
low barriers to entry may rebut a prima facie showing of illegality, even where the combined
market shares of the merged firms is quite high.").
40. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1222 ("We conclude that in certain circumstances,
a defendant may rebut the government's prima facie case with evidence showing that the
intended merger would create significant efficiencies in the relevant market."); Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 146-47 (entertaining hospital's argument that efficiencies
could rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects); Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1300-01
(stating that efficiency gains can rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects); Country
Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 680 ("The Court finds these efficiencies relevant, not so much as
an independent factor justifying the proposed acquisition, but as further evidence that the
proposed acquisition will enhance competition.") (citations omitted). But see Staples, 970 F.
Supp. at 1089 ("Assuming that it is a viable defense, however, the Court cannot find in this
case that the defendants' efficiencies evidence rebuts the presumption that the merger may
substantially lessen competition or shows that the Commission's evidence gives an inaccu-
rate prediction of the proposed acquisition's probable effect.").
41. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1221 ("The acquired firm's weakness, then, is one
of many possible factors that a defendant may introduce to rebut the government's prima
facie case."); Freeman Hospital, 911 F. Supp. at 1225 (noting the hospital's declining admis-
sions and revenues and the hospital's "limited future of only two to three years" in assessing
the competitive effects of the merger). But see Kaiser Aluminum, 652 F.2d at 1341 ("[T]he
financial weakness of the acquired firm, while it may be a relevant factor in some cases, cer-
tainly cannot be the primary justification of a merger in resistance to a § 7 proceeding.");
Tenet Healthcare, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (rejecting the hospital's "flailing firm" defense as a
factual matter, reasoning that "(flinancial weakness may constitute a defense to an antitrust
suit only where 'the defendant makes a substantial showing that the acquired firm's weak-
ness, which cannot be resolved by any competitive means, would cause that firm's market
share to reduce to a level that would undermine the government's prima facie case.' ")
(quoting University Health, 938 F.2d at 1221). The "weak" or "flailing" firm argument is simi-
lar to the failing firm defense, which applies when defendants demonstrate a grave
probability of business failure and the absence of any other prospective purchaser. See Citi-
zen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-38 (1969). The failing firm defense is
subject to different doctrinal interpretations. It may indicate a social policy benefiting weak
or failing businesses. Alternatively, it can be rationalized within the Philadelphia framework
as evidence that the merger will not increase market power due to the extremely weakened
status of one of the merging parties.
42. There in no consistent theory as to why the presence of sophisticated buyers
should be capable of rebutting the Philadelphia presumption. Some courts use the reaction
of buyers as a proxy to assess the likely competitive effects of merger on the assumption that
the absence of buyer opposition is evidence of the absence of likely anticompetitive effects.
See Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1223 ("The market for hospital services in the Joplin area
is dominated by large, sophisticated payors. Notably, no third-party payor or customers have
expressly objected to this consolidation."); Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 144.
Dr. Stocker, the spokesman for Empire, a prominent, multifaceted MCO, and with
almost 5 million insureds, alleged to be the largest payer in the market (Tr. at 215-
16), was of the opinion that the merger was 'a good idea... [and] would help drive
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stts436 hnin akt . 44status, (6) c angi g m r et conditions, (7) direct evidence that
mergers will not increase prices, 45 and (8) promises by the merging
down costs.' Rather then being anti-competitive, he believed it would decrease prices
Id.
Other courts, whether they are persuaded on the particular facts of the case or not, ap-
pear to believe that sophisticated buyers can use their "power" to offset the merged sellers
market power. See Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 679 ("The most persuasive argument
proffered by defendants to rebut the presumption of violation of Section 7 is the power of
the buyers in the MSP/MSA. Defendants contend that this power precludes the exercise of
market power by the dairies.").
Some courts have treated buyer sophistication as a factor in examining the ability of sell-
ers to collude in the post-merger market. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1213, n.13 (noting
that large sophisticated buyers may be relevant to the issue of seller collusion, but conclud-
ing that the actual buyer was the individual patient and not the larger insurance company).
Other courts have rejected the presence of sophisticated buyers as a consideration capa-
ble of rebutting market-share presumptions. The defendant in United Tote argued that the
market was dominated by large sophisticated buyers and that these buyers did not object to
the merger. The court rejected the argument, stating, "the Court finds that the presence of
some large sophisticated consumers in the North American totalisator market would not be
sufficient to offset the anti-competitive effects of the merger." United Tote, 768 F. Supp. at
1084-85; see also Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 61 ("In the end, although this Court finds
that buyer power does exist in whole market ... and is worthy of consideration, it alone
cannot rebut the Government's prima facie case."). For an academic treatment of the role
of buyer sophistication in section 7 cases, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 477-82; Michael
S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1, 8-12 (1994).
43. See Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 146 ("[T] he Court deduces that
while the not-for-profit status of the merging hospitals does not provide an exemption from
the antitrust laws, this factor may be considered if supported by other evidence that such
status would inhibit anti-competitive effects."); Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97 ("The
nonprofit status of the hospitals is not a dispositive consideration, but it is material....
These findings suggest that a substantial increase in market concentration among nonprofit
hospitals is not likely to result in price increases."); Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1222-23
(characterizing a local nonprofit hospital as a "consumer cooperative" and noting that "it
would not be in these individual Board member's best economic interest to permit prices to
be raised beyond a normal competitive level"). But see University Health, 938 F.2d at 1224
("Thus, the nonprofit status of the acquiring firm will not, by itself, help a defendant over-
come the presumption of illegality that arises from the government's prima facie case.").
44. Changing market conditions was a factor advanced by the defendant in United Tote.
United Tote argues that the racing industry is experiencing dramatic changes, in-
cluding consolidation or wagering networks into statewide or regional systems,
interstate commingling of betting pools, blending of lottery and racing wagers,
growth of off-track betting and the advent of sports wagering. United Tote asserts
that, without merger, United will be unable to sustain the research, development,
production and service efforts that an increasingly complex racing industry will de-
mand.
United Tote, 768 F. Supp. at 1082. The court considered but was not persuaded by the argu-
ment. See id. at 1082-84.
45. Direct evidence concerning the effects of market power has been considered un-
der a number of different guises. The defendants in Butterworth introduced econometric
evidence of the effect of market power on the pricing behavior of nonprofit hospitals. See
Butte-worth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295 ("Defendants begin their rebuttal by arguing that high
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parties not to behave anticompetitively, such as promises not to
raise prices.46
Unfortunately, this list of factors does not establish a coherent
framework in which to assess how or when the Philadelphia pre-
sumption should be rebutted. In my view, the rule in Philadelphia
can best be understood in terms of a two-step formula. The first
step equates market-share with market power. The second step
equates market power with anticompetitive effects. The first step
involves a factual inquiry into the existence of market power (using
market-share as a proxy), while the second step reflects a purely
theoretical inference of anticompetitive effects from a finding of
market power.
Many of the post-General Dynamics developments simply flesh out
the contestability of the first step of the Philadelphia formula. 4' The
concentration in the hospital industry should not be presumed to result in anticompetitive
effects. Specifically, defendants contend that empirical proof does not support the presump-
tion that high concentration of market power among nonprofit hospitals results in price
increases."). In other cases, the defendants attempt to use direct evidence to attack or un-
dermine the government's theory or statistics. See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1083-86
(considering defendant's evidence directly challenging the likely connection between mar-
ket-share and price in the market of office supplies); United Tote, 768 F. Supp. at 1070-71
(considering defendants' challenge to the government's methodology for defining markets
and projecting price increases). In some cases, courts have used testimony from large buyers
as direct evidence of the likely effects of merger. See Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp.
at 143-45; Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1223-24.
46. The defendants in Butterworth made such promises:
In the way of additional assurance that the merged entity would not exercise its mar-
ket power to raise prices or otherwise injure the community, defendants offer the
'Community Commitment.'... The Community Commitment has five parts: (1) the
commitment to freeze list prices or charges, (2) the commitment to freeze prices to
managed care plans at pre-merger levels, (3) the commitment to limit margins, (4)
the commitment to the underserved and medically needy, and (5) the commitment
regarding governance of the merged entity.
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298; see also Long Island Jewish Med. Otr., 983 F. Supp. at 144
("Further, NSM and LIJ have stipulated with the New York State Attorney General not to
raise prices for at least two years after the merger is consummated."). But see University
Health, 938 F.2d at 1224 ("University Hospital's business decisions are not mandated by law;
rather, its governing body is free to decide where to set prices and output. While University
Hospital's prior practices may suggest its future conduct, such evidence has limited proba-
tive value. The appellees' self-serving declarations simply do little to undermine the
impressive evidence the FTC has introduced to make its case.")
47. The current enforcement agencies' merger guidelines are illustrative. The central
focus of the 1992 Guidelines is on defining economic markets (product and geographic),
and calculating levels of concentration. See 1992 Guidelines, supra note 35, §§ 1.1, 1.2, 1.4.
Prosecutorial decisions are directly tied to the resulting concentration ratios. See id. § 1.5.
The Guidelines analysis of market entry, see id. § 3, and the range of economic factors that
might facilitate collusion, see id. § 2.1, proceed to address whether market power, if it is
proven to exist, can be exercised. With the notable exception of economic efficiencies, see id.
§ 4, the inquiry does not focuses on the second step of the Philadelphia formula-whether
[VOL. 32:4
Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions
market power inquiry has been bifurcated into an assessment of
whether market power exists (the process of defining product and
geographic markets and calculating levels of economic concentra-
tion) and whether market power can be exercised (arguments
focusing on factors such as ease of market entry and the various
considerations that may facilitate collusion) 48 These refinements
represent logical efforts to test the robustness and veracity of the
defined market, and to further assess whether high levels of con-
centration in the defined market can fairly be equated with market
power. Other aspects of the post-General Dynamics developments,
however, do not fit neatly within this characterization.
B. Efficiency and Balancing Under Section 7
Efficiency arguments present a more direct challenge to the
Philadelphia/General Dynamics framework. Efficiency arguments do
not deny the existence of market power, nor do they suggest that
market power cannot be exercised. Indeed, certain efficiencies are
achieved only at scales that necessarily entail the creation of mar-
ket power and the production of anticompetitive effects: the
relatively higher prices, reduced output, and allocative inefficiency
represented by the monopolist's dead weight loss triangle.49 Rather
than denying the reality of anticompetitive effects, these arguments
contend that efficiency gains should be balanced against anticom-
petitive harms, and that mergers should be permitted if the
efficiency gains outweigh the anticompetitive losses.50 The prospect
of balancing the pro- and anti-competitive effects of merger raises
doctrinal questions that go beyond Philadelphia and General Dynamics
market power produces undesirable consequences, or whether alleged pro-competitive
benefits of merger can be balanced against acknowledged anti-competitive effects. The cen-
tral role of market-share rules and presumptions in the 1992 Guidelines is similar to earlier
DOJ versions. See Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Effi-
ciency, and Failure, 71 CAL. L. REv. 497, 497 n.2, 505-10 (1983) (examining the role of
presumptions and market-share rules under the 1968 and 1982 DOJ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines).
48. These inquiries are obviously related and frequently overlap. The difference be-
tween a narrowly defined market with a finding of substantial likelihood of entry, and a
more broadly defined market that includes the potential entrant is often a matter of charac-
terization and timing.
49. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
AM. ECON. REv. 18, 22 (1968) (discussing the anti-competitive effects of market power).
50. See id. at 21-23 (outlining the classic framework in which the anti-competitive ef-
fects of merger are balanced against increases in productive efficiency); see also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 3, at 452-55 (explaining Williamson's tradeoff model).
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and require further refinement of the discussion of the refutability
of market-share rules.51
It is helpful to construct a decision tree that illustrates various pos-
sible approaches to section 7 of the Clayton Act.
FIGURE ONE
DECISION TREE FOR SECTION 7 ANALYSIS
Market Share ?
Lo \ High
Legal Market Power ?
NoA Yes
Legal Presume Anticompetitive Effects
Balancing ?
No Yes
Illegal
(First Approach) Type of Analysis ?
Intra-Economic Extra-Economic
(Second Approach) (Third Approach)
51. The fact that efficiency claims raise issues that go beyond the Philadelphia frame-
work is not surprising. Philadelphia was decided in an era that implicitly rejected the
viability of an efficiency defense in merger cases. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 580 (1967) ("Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality."); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("Congress appreciated that occasional
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of deconcentration."). Since
General Dynamics, the Court has recognized the importance of efficiency concerns and
economic analysis in other antitrust contexts. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984) ("In Sylvania we emphasized that the legality of arguably
anticompetitive conduct should be judged primarily by its 'market impact.' "); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("Under [the rule of reason], the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."). In the last 10
years, an increasing number of lower courts have acknowledged the viability of efficiency
claims in merger cases. See cases cited supra note 40. Similarly, both federal enforcement
agencies now acknowledge the validity of efficiency arguments. See 1992 Guidelines, supra
note 35, § 4. These developments raise questions as to how efficiency concerns can best be
layered over the framework developed in Philadelphia and General Dynamics.
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The nodes of the decision tree in Figure One correspond to (1)
the presence or absence of high levels of economic concentration
(market-share); (2) the presence or absence of market power; (3)
whether courts will "balance" the possible benefits of merger
against the anticompetitive effects of merger; and (4) if balancing
is permitted, whether such balancing takes place within an intra-
economic paradigm or an extra-economic paradigm.
Within this framework, there are three different antitrust ap-
proaches to the question of balancing and the rebuttability of the
Philadelphia presumption. The first approach rejects any concept of
balancing and rests section 7 liability strictly upon a finding of an-
ticompetitive effects. High levels of concentration in a properly
defined market would support a presumption of anticompetitive
effects, which could only be rebutted by evidence suggesting either
that no market power really existed or that such power could not
be exercised. The second and third approaches permit alleged
benefits of merger to be "balanced" against anticompetitive effects,
but differ on the type of benefits that could be considered. The
second approach permits intra-economic balancing: balancing that
takes place within the context of traditional welfare economics and
considers only economic benefits, such as increased productive or
allocative efficiency. The third approach permits extra-economic
balancing. By extra-economic balancing, I mean that judges could
consider a broad range of potential benefits of merger, including
non-economic policies and objectives. In assessing the likelihood
and magnitude of anticompetitive effects, however, both the sec-
ond and third approach use methods identical to the first-
market-share presumptions and inferences about anticompetitive
effects based on findings of market power.52
How do the various factors courts deem capable of rebutting the
Philadelphia presumption fit within these approaches? The first ap-
proach is concerned solely with structural economic characteristics
suggesting either that high levels of market-share cannot be
equated with market power, or that market power, if it does exist,
cannot be exercised. Entry analysis plays a central role. The
existence of failing, flailing, or weak competitors is relevant only to
the extent it suggests that market-share data overstates the pres-
ence of market power. Large sophisticated buyers are relevant only
to the extent they suggest it would be difficult to collude in a
52. Obviously, one could envision permutations within the first two nodes of the deci-
sion tree regarding the type and range of factors capable of rebutting the presumption that
market-share can be associated with market power. For simplicity, and to permit the focus to
remain on the role of balancing, these permutations are not explored here.
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post-merger environment, or that buyers were a potential source of
entry through vertical integration. Factors such as nonprofit status,
or promises by the parties not to raise prices, would not be rele-
vant. Perhaps most significantly, this approach would reject any
efficiency defense. The court's inquiry would end with a finding of
anticompetitive effects based upon a finding of market power. Al-
leged efficiency gains could not save an otherwise anticompetitive
merger.3 Strong presumptions and a refusal to balance alleged
benefits of merger channel these issues out of the judicial system
and establish a well-defined division of labor between judges and
legislators.
The second approach embraces the structural economic consid-
erations of the first in assessing the likelihood and magnitude of
the anticompetitive effects, but permits courts to consider potential
economic benefits of merger. For example, courts may balance ef-
ficiencies against acknowledged anticompetitive effects. Although
the existing case law focuses primarily on productive efficiency,
intra-economic balancing would permit consideration of other
economic benefits, such as the increase in allocative efficiency that
might result from reductions in rent-dissipating forms of non-price
competition.
Advocates of intra-economic balancing are divided in terms of
whether such balancing should be conducted under a total welfare
or a consumer surplus standard. This distinction is important in
53. This approach is consistent with the DOJ's 1968 merger guidelines. See U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice 1968 Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101, § 10
(1968) (stating that "[u]nless there are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not
accept as ajustification for an acquisition normally subject to challenge under its horizontal
merger standards, the claim that the merger will produce economies (i.e., improvements in
efficiency)"). The decision not to recognize an efficiency defense, does not mean that effi-
ciency concerns played no role in the 1968 Guidelines. The Guidelines attempted to
accommodate efficiency concerns in their determination of the concentration thresholds at
which market power would be challenged, on the expectation that most significant scale
economies could be exhausted below such thresholds. See id. §§ 5-6.
54. Advocates of an efficiency defense often expressly limit the scope of such a defense
to productive efficiency concerns. See, e.g., 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAw 949-52, at 175-81 (1980) (focusing on efficiencies such as plant size and
specialization economies); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforce-
ment in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 216 (1992) ("Efficiencies claims should be limited
to situations in which there is reliable proof that the merger would reduce by a significant
amount the unit costs of production."). These limitations are due to evidentiary concerns
and worries about the institutional capacities of the courts. The bias in favor of productive
efficiency claims is hard to justify on theoretical grounds. Conceptually, courts and policy-
makers should be concerned about the effects of merger on allocative efficiency as well as
on productive efficiency. For a discussion of the various efficiency defenses that have been
advocated and how they differ mechanically from each other, see Andrew G. Berg, Cost Effi-
ciencies in the Section 7 Calculus: A Review of the Doctrine, 37 CASE W. RES. L. Rzv. 218, 239-57
(1986).
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assessing the relevance of some of the post-General Dynamics factors.
While nonprofit status would not rebut the presumption that mar-
ket power produces anticompetitive effects, nonprofit status might
be relevant in assessing the distributional effects of merger. Distri-
butional effects are relevant under the consumer surplus standard
because the economic benefits of merger must be "passed on" in
some form to consumers.55 Intra-economic balancing assigns judges
more discretion in merger review than the first approach, but seeks
to constrain that discretion by limiting considerations of the effects
of merger to economic factors. Extra-economic goals and objec-
tives are still channeled out of the courts and into the legislative
forum.
The third approach permits the anticompetitive effects of merger
to be balanced against a wide range of potential social benefits. A
merger may be permitted either because it furthered specific extra-
economic goals or because the court believed that non-market
institutions constituted a superior means of allocating social re-
sources. For example, a court may believe that a nonprofit,
community-based hospital board, unconstrained by the demands of
competition, would make superior decisions concerning the alloca-
tion of health care resources than would a hospital in a market-based
system predicated on direct rivalry. Within the extra-economic con-
text of the third approach, nonprofit status and the expressed
intentions and promises of the merging parties might be important
in assessing the legality of mergers.
The extra-economic balancing of the third approach stands on
tenuous doctrinal grounds. Neither courts nor merging parties ex-
pressly frame their arguments in terms of embracing non-
economic factors. The extra-economic balancing typically occurs
implicitly, either by improperly expanding the factors that rebut
the Philadelphia market-share presumption, or by improperly char-
acterizing as "efficiencies" a variety of non-economic benefits of
merger. It is useful to choreograph section 7 analysis as done in
figure one and to focus on balancing within an extra-economic
paradigm, however, precisely because it makes the doctrinal prob-
lems with these contentions transparent. Section 7 analysis takes
place in the shadow of antitrust law's strong belief in the efficiency
of competitive markets. Consequently, extra-economic arguments
in favor of market power have typically received a chilly reception
from the Court.
55. See cases cited infra note 93 (requiring the efficiency benefits of merger to be
.passed on" to consumers).
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In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 5 the
Court summarily rejected the claim that markets could not ade-
quately provide for public health, welfare and safety as "nothing
less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." 7
The Court's faith in markets applies to non-price as well as price
competition, and to markets for professional as well as non-
professional services. "The assumption that competition is the best
method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all
elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and
not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free op-
portunity to select among alternative offers."58 In Indiana Federation
of Dentists, 9 the Court invalidated a practice among dentists of col-
lectively refusing to submit x-rays to insurance companies for
evaluation by third-party payors in utilization review programs. The
Court held that the practice interfered with the ability of uncon-
strained market forces to provide the appropriate allocation of
medical services:
A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services
offered to customers, no less than a refusal to compete with
respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability
of the market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provi-
sion of desired goods and services to consumers at a price
approximating the marginal cost of providing them.60
The Court rejected claims that consumers would be unable to
make educated decisions, as well as the claim that the provision of
x-rays would threaten quality of care.6'
56. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In Professional Engineers, the Court struck down an ethical
cannon that prohibited competitive bidding. The Society argued that the prohibition was
necessary because competitive bidding allegedly resulted in inferior work and a threat to
public health and safety. See id. at 684-85. The Court was unwilling to question the ability of
the market to function effectively in ensuring adequate levels of safety. Instead, the Court
viewed the market as the most reliable mechanism to make these cost/quality tradeoffs. See
id. at 694-95.
57. Id. at 695.
58. Id.
59. FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1986).
60. Id. at 459.
61. See id. at 462-63. The general reluctance to question the effects of market power
has made the Court unsympathetic to claims that the medical industry is somehow different
from other industries, or that medical markets warrant special antitrust consideration. The
Court responded hostilely to the argument that the per se rule against price fixing should
not apply to the medical industry. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
349-51'(1982) (rejecting arguments by the court of appeals that the health care industry was
too far removed from the competitive model to make traditional antitrust analysis applica-
ble). The contention that courts will not recognize a separate set of antitrust rules in health
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This faith in the efficiency of markets presents a serious chal-
lenge to advocates of extra-economic balancing, including
proponents of many hospital mergers. Hospitals claim that merg-
ers, even those that create market power, are potentially desirable
because they can reduce wasteful non-price competition, produce
62a superior distribution of resources, or reduce prices. These
claims directly challenge the efficiency of competition in health
care markets. While some of the hospitals' non-price contentions
can ultimately be brought under the umbrella of the intra-
economic analysis characteristic of the second approach, many
other aspects of the hospitals' arguments cannot.
III. THE PRESUMPTION THAT NON-PRICE
COMPETITION Is DESIRABLE
A. Non-Price Competition: Economic and
Distributional Concerns
This Article began with the surprising finding that hospital
competition in the Old Regime can lead to higher medical ex-
penses. 63 If this is true, then increases in economic concentration
care cases was reinforced in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
The Court refused to sanction restraints that were allegedly justified for health care reasons.
"Thus, we reject the view of the District Court that the legality of an arrangement of this
kind turns on whether it was adopted for the purpose of improving patient care." Id. at 25
n.41. The fact that the alleged illegal tying arrangement concerned the health care industry
did not change the Court's substantive antitrust analysis. "In the past, we have refused to
tolerate manifestly anticompetitive conduct simply because the health care industry is in-
volved." Id. at 25-26 n.42 (citing cases).
62. The hospitals' non-price contentions are addressed infra Part III. The hospitals'
price contentions are addressed infra Part IV.
63. See sources cited supra note 1. The problems surrounding hospital mergers have
generated substantial scholarly attention. See generally GloriaJ. Bazzoli et al., Federal Antitrust
Merger Enforcement Standards: A Good Fit for the Hospital Industry?, 20J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 137 (1995); Michael D. Belsley, The Vatican Merger Defense-Should Two Catholic Hospitals
Seeking to Merge Be Considered a Single Entity for Purposes of Antitrust Merger Analysis?, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 720 (1996); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care Through the
Antitrust Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 465; Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally: Anti-
trust Law and Hospital Mergers, 31 HOus. L. REv. 813 (1994); Gregory Vistmes, Hospital
Mergers and Antitrust Enforcement, 20J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 175 (1995); Michael G.
Vita et al., Economic Analysis in Health Care Antitrust, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'v 73
(1991); Dennis A. Yao, The Analysis of Hospital Mergers and Joint Ventures: What May Change?,
1995 UTAH L. REV. 381; Stephen Paul Paschall, Comment, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers: A
Law and Economics Rationale for Exemption, 30 Duq. L. Rv. 61 (1991). Almost the entire
Spring 1999 issue of ANTITRUST is devoted to the problems raised by hospital mergers. See
Jeffrey W. Brennan and Paul C. Cuomo, The "Nonprofit Defense" in Hospital Merger Antitrust
Litigation, ANTITRUST, Spring 1999 at 13; Monica Noether, Overview: Economic Issues in
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should be associated with lower health care costs. This possibility
leads to a superficially appealing argument in favor of hospital
mergers. Unfortunately, the problem is slightly more complicated
than the simple relationship between market power and medical
costs might suggest. The correlation between economic concentra-
tion and higher medical costs is best explained by the effects of
market structure on non-price competition. Mergers decrease costs
by decreasing the provision of non-price services; whether such re-
ductions are desirable as a matter of health care policy depends
upon the social value of the non-price services that are eliminated.
One can construct a model of hospital competition establishing
a direct relationship between the intensity of non-price competi-
tion and the number of hospitals in the market. 4 In this model,
increasing the number of hospitals increases the level of non-price
attributes hospitals provide. Correspondingly, decreasing the
number of hospitals decreases the amount of non-price competi-
tion. Non-price competition, in turn, is directly related to hospital
costs. The higher the level of non-price competition, the higher
the level of hospital-specific and market-wide medical expenses.
Consequently, one would expect mergers in the Old Regime (and
economic concentration in general) to be associated with lower
costs, not necessarily as a result of increased productive efficiency,
but as a result of decreased non-price competition.5
Given that mergers decrease costs by decreasing the level of non-
price services, it is necessary to explore the welfare and distributional
implications of merger. The impact of hospital mergers can be
Hospital Merger Policy, supra, at 6; Richard D. Raskin and Bruce M. Zessar, Telling the Efficiency
Story: Practical Lessons from the Hospital Merger Field, ANTITRUST, supra, at 21; Gregory S. Vist-
nes, Defining Geographic Markets for Hospital Mergers, ANTITRUST, supra, at 28.
64. See Hammer, Mergers, Market Power and Competition, supra note 1, at 103-18.
The model is a Cournot-type model of quality competition, assuming fixed prices and a form
of quality competition that takes place exclusively along vertical non-price dimensions. The
results of the model track the results of the traditional Cournot model of quantity competi-
tion. The amount of non-price attributes on the market varies directly with the number of
competitors: the higher the number of competitors the higher the level of non-price attrib-
utes. Individual and firm-specific profits vary inversely with the number of competitors: the
larger the number of competitors the lower the profit levels. See also Hammer, Price and
Quality Competition, supra note 19, at 131-32 (contrasting the results of the non-price compe-
tition model with the results of the traditional Cournot model).
65. See sources cited supra note 1. The claim that lower costs in concentrated markets
are attributable to increases in productive efficiency is not well supported. Economies of
scale are associated with hospital size, not market structure. While productive efficiency
concerns may motivate some mergers, the relevant factor isolated in this literature is market
structure (controlling for differences in hospital size) and the dynamics of non-price compe-
tition.
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viewed in terms of producer and consumer surplus.6 If there are
no corresponding reductions in price and if the non-price attribute
has any value to consumers, then reducing the level of the non-
price attribute will decrease consumer surplus. Conversely, in the
absence of price concessions, the lower costs associated with de-
creased non-price competition will increase hospital surplus
(profits). In determining the social desirability of mergers, it is
necessary to consider both effects by examining the impact of
merger on total welfare (the sum of producer and consumer sur-
plus). Much of the confusion in the hospital merger case law can
be attributed to the failure of courts and the FTC to explicitly rec-
ognize and balance these concurrent and conflicting effects.
B. FTC-In re American Medical International, Inc.
In 1979, the for-profit hospital chain American Medical Interna-
tional ("AMI") acquired French Hospital in San Luis Obispo,
giving AMI control of three of the five hospitals in the county. In
1981, the FTC challenged the acquisition under a variety of anti-
trust theories, seeking divestiture of French Hospital. The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled against AMI, and AMI ap-
pealed to the full Commission. 7 AMI's brief and Commissioner
Calvani's decision provide a thorough examination of the legal and
economic issues raised by hospital competition in the Old Regime.
AMI challenged the ALJ's determination that the widespread qual-
ity and non-price competition characteristic of hospital markets
66. By focusing on hospital profits and consumer surplus, this analysis does not di-
rectly consider the effects of merger on physician well-being. Non-price competition can
take many different forms. Some forms seek to cultivate physician loyalty and affiliation as a
surrogate means of obtaining patients. This article assesses allocative efficiency in terms of
the health care consumer's willingness to pay. Under such a standard, non-price investments
that generate direct benefits to patients/consumers are extended a higher level of antitrust
protection than non-price investments aimed at elements in physician utility functions.
Moreover, this analysis is indifferent to whether economic rents go to hospitals or are shared
by physicians. If one believed that competition for physicians generated no social value, then
the economic cost of certain types of physician-oriented non-price competition may be even
greater than suggested by the allocative inefficiency standing alone. Cf Richard A. Posner,
The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 807, 809-15 (1975) (exploring
generally how the efforts to obtain and retain monopoly power can constitute part of the
social cost of monopoly.).
67. See In reAmerican Med. Int'l, Inc. 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984).
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constituted beneficial forms of economic competition that should
be protected by the antitrust laws.68
[C] onduct of this kind in the hospital field is not competition
in the economic sense because it is not disciplined by an ef-
fective price mechanism. Neither doctors, nor hospitals, nor
patients weigh the benefits of additional services and equip-
ment against their costs. Such activity thus takes place without
regard to existing duplicative facilities in the same locality or
anticipated volume of use.69
The FTC rejected AMI's claim, reasoning that hospitals actively
compete along non-price dimensions and that non-price competi-
tion is desirable.7 0 Furthermore, the FTC found that the merger
had already generated anticompetitive effects. "AMI's acquisition
of French Hospital virtually eliminated the nonprice competition
that existed between hospitals in San Luis Obispo."71 In declaring
the acquisition unlawful, the FTC focused almost exclusively upon
the effects of merger on consumer surplus. Commissioner Calvani
reasoned that non-price competition enhanced consumer surplus.
"There is no doubt that consumers in the health care industry
benefit substantially from the nonprice competition that exists
.... ,,72 From that point on, the logic of the opinion is easy to sum-
marize: non-price competition increases consumer surplus,
mergers decrease non-price competition, therefore, hospital merg-
ers are undesirable.
[T] he nonprice competition that does exist in the industry re-
sponds to consumers' expressions of their wants by providing
services valued by physicians and patients, such as expanding
the range of choices available to them, stimulating innova-
tion, and developing expertise by hospitals, we conclude that
"rivalry" among hospitals along nonprice dimensions consti-
tutes competition in the economic sense that warrants
protection by the antitrust laws.
73
68. Respondents' Brief on Appeal from Initial Decision, In re American Med. Int'l,
Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 12-13 (1984) (Docket No. 9158).
69. Id. (citations omitted).
70. See In re American Med. Int'l, 104 F.T.C. at 182-85.
71. Id. at 207.
72. Id. at 184.
73. Id. at 185. The district court in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp.
1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), also acknowledged the beneficial
effects of hospital competition on quality and non-price dimensions:
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The Commission dismissed AMI's claim that non-price competi-
tion, undisciplined by an active price mechanism, was
undesirable.4 The FIC contended that hospital behavior was suffi-
ciently constrained because hospital administrators factored in the
costs of the non-price attribute when making their internal deci-
sions.7" This analysis, however, runs the danger of missing an
important point. Non-price competition may be rational from the
individual hospital perspective (the revenues generated exceed the
cost of the investment) but irrational from the social perspective
(the cost of the investment in the non-price attribute exceeds what
informed consumers would be willing to pay if offered a lower
quality option at a correspondingly lower price). It is the latter
comparison that is economically germane, unless one views non-
price competition simply as a device for transforming producer
surplus into consumer surplus. Market failures in the Old Regime
distort the economic signaling role of prices. One cannot necessar-
ily infer that because a transaction takes place the cost of providing
the non-price amenity reflects what consumers would be willing to
pay if given an unbundled option. Competition strictly for market-
shares may well lead to decisions that, while individually rational,
are socially undesirable. 76 Not surprisingly, some commentators
compare the medical arms race driving hospital non-price compe-
tition with the prisoner's dilemma.77
For similar reasons, non-price competition such as advertising and quality of care has
also intensified, as each hospital desires to offer physicians and patients the latest
medical technology and services in an effort to present itself as a full service high
quality institution. The hoped-for result of these efforts, of course, is the attraction of
quality physicians and more and better paying patients.
Id. (citations to record omitted). The court held that eliminating non-price competition
would be one of the anticompetitive temptations of merger. "Through a collusive exercise of
market power the hospitals in the relevant market could also eliminate 'quality' competition
that has been a major drain on the hospitals' budget." Id. at 1285.
74. See In re American Med. Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 182-83.
75. See id. at 183.
76. Hospitals are concerned with the determinants of hospital-specific demand. Qual-
ity investments stimulate hospital-specific demand both by increasing market demand and,
more importantly, by diverting demand from other hospitals. The "demand-stealing" effects
provide incentives to supply quantities of the non-price attribute that may exceed the level
justified by consumer preferences as reflected in the market demand function. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
77. See generallyJoseph M. Jadlow, Hospital Competition and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 25 Rrv-
ISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMERCIALI 360 (1978).
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C. District Court Cases
If AM! can be criticized for its myopic focus on consumer sur-
plus, the district court in Carilion78 can be criticized for the
opposite failing. The court failed to distinguish the impact of
merger on non-price competition from possible productive effi-
ciency gains, holding that mergers decrease costs and that all cost
reductions are desirable.79 The district court in University Health8 °
was more explicit, contending that reduced competition after the
merger would be in the public interest because it would eliminate
"unnecessary and wasteful duplication."8' The court failed to ap-
preciate the negative impact that reduced non-price competition
would have on consumers. The same mistake is frequently made in
health care policy circles. Like most errors, it is half-grounded in
truth. Mergers lower costs by decreasing the amount of non-price
competition, not by improving productive efficiency. The merged
hospitals are not providing the same product at a lower cost;
rather, the hospitals are supplying a different product at a lower
cost, a product with fewer non-price attributes. Failure to recognize
this distinction has led courts to ignore the potential loss to con-
sumers-the consumer benefits identified by the Commission in
AMP-and to look favorably on any merger that decreases hospital
costs (and correspondingly increases hospital profits).
78. United States v. Carilion Hosp. Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989).
79. Id. at 846; see also Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp 121, 142 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (tending to classify reductions in cost due to avoiding the duplication of services as
unambiguous efficiency gains, rather than reductions in the range of services available to
consumers).
80. FTC v. University Health, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 69,400 (S.D. Ga.),
rev'd, 938 F.2d 1206 (llth Cir. 1991).
81. Id. at 65,615. The district court reasoned that non-price competition was undesir-
able and that the elimination of "unnecessary duplication" was a factor justifying the merger.
On appeal, the FTC argued that the hospitals' efforts to eliminate non-price competition
was evidence of the merger's likely anticompetitive effect (stating the merger would yield a
level of service and non-price amenities that would be lower than the comparable competi-
tive equilibrium). See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1220 n.27. While noting the FTC's
position, the appellate court did not attempt to resolve the conflict. See id. Instead, the court
reversed the district court's denial of the FTC's preliminary injunction holding that, as a
factual matter, the merging hospitals had failed to meet their burden of demonstrating with
sufficient evidence the existence of actual efficiencies to justify the merger. See id. at 1223.
82. Appreciation of the potential benefits of non-price competition is not limited to
AMI. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946 (E.D. Mo. 1998) ("The
competition has prompted improved hospital quality and services. To compete within the
market, Lucy Lee and DRMC have routinely added new services, recruited high-quality phy-
sicians to an area that traditionally would have difficulties attracting physicians, and
established rural outreach clinics."), rev'd., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
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The district court in Mercy Health Services 3 similarly failed to ap-
preciate the detrimental effects of reducing non-price competition.
The court provided a caricatured version of the government's ar-
gument-reducing the government's concerns over non-price
competition to concerns over the remodeling of hospital rooms
and the elimination of free consumer give-aways. s4 The government
attempted to portray post-merger reductions in non-price competi-
tion as a price increase, rightfully arguing that consumers would be
paying higher relative prices. 5 The court rejected the claim:
The government has not shown that these amenities improve
the quality of health care received and it can certainly be ar-
gued that they unnecessarily add to health care costs. Further,
even if not giving away car seats or failing to remodel can be
considered a price increase, the government has not shown
these to be significant price increases for purposes of antitrust
analysis.8 6
The Mercy Health Services court may or may not be right as a mat-
ter of social policy, but one thing is certain: by second-guessing the
desirability of non-price competition, the court is substituting its
own judgment concerning the proper allocation of social resources
for thejudgment of the market. As such, the debate over non-price
competition is actually a debate over whether hospital competition
in the Old Regime is a rational means of allocating health care re-
sources. Unfortunately, most courts engage in this analysis without
thoughtful consideration of how such an economic assessment
should be carried out or whether such arguments are doctrinally
legitimate.
83. United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
84. See id. at 987.
85. See id. at 986-87. If one could accurately calculate quality-adjusted prices, then the
problems of non-price competition could be conceptually reduced to a problem of price
competition. It is simply wrong, however, to conclude that there are no antitrust issues when
one observes constant prices in the face of falling quality. Courts in other antitrust contexts
have acknowledged the importance of considering quality-adjusted prices. See Roland Mach.
Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing the potential of exclusive
dealing arrangements to produce lower quality-adjusted prices); Little Caesar Enter. v.
Smith, 1997-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 71,817, at 79,755 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (discussing quality-
adjusted prices in the context of tied products).
86. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. at 987.
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D. Total Welfare Criterion
In deciding whether courts should entertain arguments con-
cerning the efficacy of competition, it is helpful to understand how
non-price competition problems might be resolved as a matter of
social policy. A social planner would assess the effects of hospital
mergers on total social welfare. A total welfare standard would
permit a merger so long as it satisfied the following two criteria: (1)
the cost savings gained by reducing non-price competition are
greater than the corresponding decrease in consumer surplus; and
(2) the net gains in social welfare from reduced non-price compe-
tition (if any) outweigh other anticompetitive effects."' The first
requirement will be satisfied if the gain to hospitals from restricting
non-price competition exceeds the loss to consumers from the re-
duction in the non-price attribute.8 The analysis can be thought of
87. Elsewhere, I have outlined a framework for assessing legislative reforms of the anti-
trust laws. Desirable reforms should: (1) be targeted at remedying an identifiable market
failure; (2) increase total welfare (static efficiency concerns); and (3) not adversely affect
the underlying structure and operation of the market (dynamic efficiency concerns). See
Hammer, Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm, supra note 16, at 13-14. This
Article focuses mainly on the static welfare effects of hospital mergers. Consequently, the
considerations isolated in the text-whether the increase in producer profits exceeds the
reduction in consumer surplus and whether the net welfare increase outweighs the anti-
competitive effects of merger-flesh out the second prong of the three part test. Before
sanctioning increases in market power, policymakers would also want to be certain that the
merger would not undermine the underlying transition of health care markets to more
efficient organizational forms (dynamic efficiency). Some of the dynamic efficiency con-
cerns raised by hospital mergers were addressed supra note 27 (discussion of hospital
incentives to eliminate excess capacity), others are addressed infra notes 142-143 and ac-
companying text (discussion of hospital incentives in Butterworth to forestall the transition
from the Old to the Emerging Regime via the Community Commitment Letter).
88. In practice, determining consumer valuation of non-price amenities is a difficult
task. A working price mechanism provides a visible benchmark of the minimum amount
purchasing consumers are willing to pay for any given service. In the Old Regime, numerous
factors dilute the economic content of price signals. Some insight can be gained by recog-
nizing that there are different types of non-price competition. Simplistically, one can think
of "actual" quality competition, "perceived" quality competition, and competition for physi-
cian affiliation. Competition that fosters investments aimed at improving "actual" quality,
defined as investments targeted at well-informed consumers, deserves the most protection.
Competition in "perceived" quality, defined as investments targeted at imperfectly informed
consumers, is less valuable. Finally, competition strictly for physician loyalty and affiliation,
defined as investments aimed at elements in individual physician utility functions, deserves
the least amount of protection.
The implications for merger analysis are straightforward. Debate should focus on the so-
cial desirability of the specific types of non-price competition that are dominant in a given
market. As a theoretical matter, the question is whether consumers value the non-price
attribute sufficiently so that they would be willing to independently pay for its costs as an
unbundled option. The effects of reduced non-price competition on hospital surplus are
potentially easier to quantify.
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in terms of a Kaldor-Hicks compensation problem, 9 or assessing
whether the merger is potentially Pareto superior.90 If the net gain
is positive and exceeds whatever other anticompetitive effects
might be associated with the merger, then the merger increases
total welfare and should be permitted.
While economists are quick to reference the total welfare crite-
ria, the standard employed by antitrust courts and scholars is less
clear. Judge Bork calls on courts to use a "consumer welfare" stan-
dard,9 ' but defines "consumer welfare" in a manner that is identical
to the "total welfare" standard described above.92 When courts re-
quire efficiency gains of mergers to be "passed on" to consumers,
they are implicitly using a consumer surplus standard of review. 
93
89. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-17 (5th ed. 1998)
(discussing the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency).
90. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 13, at 40-41 (discussing the concept of potential
Pareto improvements).
91. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
107-15 (The Free Press 1993) (1978) (defining his concept of consumer welfare).
92. I use the terms total welfare, producer surplus and consumer surplus in the tradi-
tional economic sense of partial equilibrium analysis, where consumer surplus represents
the difference between the amount consumers would be willing to pay for the product and
how much they actually pay, and producer surplus can be equated with producer profits. See,
e.g., John R. Morris, International Trade and Antitrust: Comments, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 945, 945
n.4 (1993) (noting how antitrust use of "consumer welfare" differs from traditional eco-
nomic use of the term "consumer surplus"). Unfortunately, substantial confusion surrounds
the term "consumer welfare." Consumer welfare has been called "the most abused term in
modem antitrust analysis." Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Con-
sumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1032 (1987). Judge Bork's
use of "consumer welfare" to mean what economists call "total welfare" (the sum of pro-
ducer and consumer surplus) has caused those who advocate for what economists would call
a "consumer surplus" standard to (re)define their criteria in distributional terms of prevent-
ing "wealth transfers." See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 74-77 (1982).
Whether antitrust law should be guided by a total welfare or a consumer surplus standard of
merger review remains an important legal and policy question. Contrasting consumer sur-
plus and total welfare (as done in this Article) is helpful because it does not mask the
distributive implications of the debate.
93. Many courts require efficiency benefits of merger to be "passed on" to consumers.
In AMI, Calvani required the hospitals to establish that the efficiency gains will "necessarily
inure to the benefit of consumers." In reAmerican Med. Int'l., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 219 (1984).
The district court in Rockford imposed a similar requirement. See United States v. Rockford
Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D. 11. 1989) ("[D]efendants must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the efficiencies provided by the merger produce a sig-
nificant economic benefit to consumers ... ."), aid 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); see also FTC
v. University Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (lth Cir. 1991) ("[W]e hold that a defendant
who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would substantially lessen
competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would result in significant econo-
mies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition, and hence,
consumers."); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d. 34, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (evaluating
the defendants claim that at least half of the efficiency gains of merger would be passed on
to consumers in the form of lower prices); FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Stipp. 2d
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More often, it is not possible to tell whether antitrust opinions,
even those that invoke "consumer" interests or speak expressly in
terms of "consumer welfare," intend to employ a total welfare or a
consumer surplus standard to guide their decision making.94
937, 948 (E.D. Mo. 1998) ("For example, defendants claim that the merger will increase
efficiencies by decreasing operating costs and avoiding capital costs. However, the merged
hospital is unlikely to pass these savings on to its consumers absent competitive pressure to
lower prices."), rev'd, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Long Island Jewish
Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he defendants must show that the
intended merger itself, rather than any other factor, would result in significant economies
and that these economies ultimately would benefit the consumers."); FTC v. Staples, 970 F.
Supp. 1066, 1089-90 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting defendants argument that two-thirds of the
projected efficiencies would be passed on to consumers through lower prices); FTC v. But-
terworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("In sum, the Court is
persuaded that the proposed merger would result in significant efficiencies ... and repre-
sents savings that would, in view of defendants' nonprofit status and the Community
Commitment, invariably be passed on to consumers."); United States v. United Tote Inc.,
768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991) ("[Elven if the merger resulted in efficiency
gains, there are no guarantees that these savings would be passed on to the consuming pub-
lic."); California v. American Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
("Moreover, even assuming these efficiency savings do result, the Court is not convinced
that defendants will invariably pass these savings on to consumers."). For academic commen-
tary on the "passing on" requirement, see Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In
Search of a Defense, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 515, 545-47 (1996); Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating
for Efficiency in Health Care Through the Antitrust Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 495; and Rob-
ert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 CEO.
L.J. 195, 197-98, 221 (1992). See generally Robert M. Vernail, One Step Forward, One Step Back:
How the Pass-On Requirement for Efficiencies Benefits in FTC v. Staples Undermines the Revisions to
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 133 (1998); Paul L.
Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger Efficiencies: Reconsidering the "Passing-On" Requirement, 64 ANTI-
TRUST LJ. 735 (1996).
94. The FTC's opinion in In re Hospital Corp. of America, 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985), affd
Hospital Corp. of Am., 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), and the district court's opinion in Rock-
ford Memorial were both appealed to the Seventh Circuit and decided in opinions authored
by Judge Richard Posner. Judge Posner's academic writings embrace a total welfare or
wealth maximization standard. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and
from the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433
(1992) [hereinafter Posner, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights] (stating that 'judges should
interpret the antitrust statutes to make them conform to the dictates of wealth maximiza-
tion"); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAwV: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22
(1976) (discussing the goals of antitrust law). Posner acknowledges that Bork's use of
.consumer welfare" is simply code language for total welfare. Posner, Unenumerated Constitu-
tional Rights, supra, at 434 ("Bork called his theory 'consumer welfare maximization,' but that
is just a reassuring term for wealth maximization.") (footnote omitted). The inferences to be
drawn from Posner's judicial opinions, however, are less clear. According to Judge Posner,
"the economic concept of competition, rather than any desire to preserve rivals as such, is
the lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of antitrust laws, not excluding
the Clayton Act." Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1386. In explaining the "economic" approach,
Posner focuses upon the impact of the merger on consumers. "So it was prudent for the
Commission, rather than resting on the very strict merger decisions of the 1960s, to inquire
into the probability of harm to consumers." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Rockford Memorial,
Posner maintained that "the current understanding of section 7 is that it forbids mergers
that are likely to 'hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in the market to collude
.... '" United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1990)
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This ambiguity is unfortunate because a consumer surplus stan-
dard and a total welfare standard can produce different results.
Table One-"Welfare Classification of Mergers" outlines six cate-
gories of mergers, classified by the merger's effect on consumer
surplus, producer surplus and total welfare. It is assumed that a
merger's net welfare effect must be either positive or negative from
each constituent perspective.
TABLE ONE
WELFARE CLASSIFICATION OF MERGERS9"
CATEGORIES OF MERGERS
1 2 3 4 5 6
Total Welfare + + + - - -
Consumer Surplus + - + - + -
Product Surplus + + - + - -
A total welfare criterion permits any merger in which the net ef-
fect is positive (Categories 1-3). Given that the parties must agree
to the merger, it can be assumed that only mergers that increase
producer surplus will take place (Categories 1, 2, and 4). The total
welfare and the consumer surplus standard allow Category 1 mergers
(quoting Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1386) (emphasis added). On their face, these passages
tend to suggest a consumer surplus standard of review-antitrust law prohibits restraints of
trade that have the effect of reducing consumer surplus-unless one defines "consumers" in
these opinions not as the actual purchasers of the hospital's services, but rather as represent-
ing all members of society, i.e. as shareholders of the for-profit corporation in Hospital Corp.
or as all members of the "community" represented by the nonprofit hospital boards in Rock-
ford Memorial. See, e.g., BORK supra note 91, at 110 ("Those who continue to buy after a
monopoly is formed pay more for the same output, and that shifts income from them to the
monopoly and its owners, who are also consumers. This is not dead-weight loss due to re-
striction of output but merely a shift in income between two classes of consumers.").
95. Table One separates mergers into six possible categories, depending upon the ef-
fect a merger has on consumer surplus, producer surplus (profits), and total welfare. Total
welfare is simply the sum of producer and consumer surplus. For example, a Category 1
merger increases both producer surplus (profits) and consumer surplus. This type of
merger makes all stakeholders better off. The merger most feared by the antitrust law is
where the decrease in consumer surplus is greater than the increase in producer surplus,
leading to reduction in total welfare (a Category 4 merger).
A total welfare antitrust standard would prohibit all mergers that decrease total welfare
(Categories 4-6) and would permit mergers that increase total welfare (Categories 1-3). A
consumer surplus antitrust standard would prohibit mergers that decrease consumer surplus
(Categories 2, 4, and 6) and would permit any mergers that increased consumer surplus
(Categories 1, 3, and 5). The total welfare and the consumer surplus standard will differ in
Category 2 mergers, where there is a clear reduction in consumer surplus, but a more than
off-setting increase in producer surplus, leading to an increase in total welfare.
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in which all stakeholders are made better off. Both standards will
disallow mergers in which the harm to consumers exceeds the
benefit to producers (Category 4 mergers where the net effect on
total welfare is negative). The total welfare standard and the con-
sumer surplus standard, however, differ in Category 2 mergers.
Category 2 mergers involve a clear reduction in consumer surplus,
but while consumers are worse off, their loss is more than offset by
the gain to producers.96 From a total welfare perspective, these
mergers should be permitted. This is the scenario potentially
raised by hospital mergers that reduce non-price competition in
the Old Regime.
Analysis of non-price competition under a total welfare standard
is an example of intra-economic balancing. The cost of merger (in
the form of reduced consumer surplus) is balanced against the
benefit of merger (cost savings that would flow to the hospitals
from reduced non-price expenditures). A finding that the gains to
hospitals exceed the loss to consumers is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for merger approval. The net gains in terms of
reduced non-price competition must then be balanced against
other potential anticompetitive effects, including the effect of
merger on health care prices.97 There is no theoretical or empirical
reason to believe that all or even most hospital mergers in the Old
Regime are, in fact, efficiency-enhancing Category.2 mergers. This
is an open question. It is likely that in some circumstances the re-
duced non-price competition will create a net reduction in total
welfare (i.e., a Category 4 merger).
If a court were to employ a consumer surplus standard, its analy-
sis would be substantially different. Any reduction in consumer
surplus would be a sufficient reason to oppose the merger. Under
a consumer surplus standard, courts would examine whether the
96. Category 2 also includes some mergers envisioned by Oliver Williamson in his ad-
vocacy of an efficiency defense. See Williamson, supra note 49, at 21-23. Productive efficiency
gains of merger may produce cost savings that favorably shift the average cost curve. These
gains may exceed the dead weight loss attributed to a reduction in allocative efficiency. See
id. Under such circumstances, total welfare is increased, but there is no guarantee that con-
sumer surplus will be similarly enhanced. A total welfare standard would permit any merger
where the productive efficiency gain exceeds the dead weight loss. A consumer surplus stan-
dard would prohibit mergers unless the increase in productive efficiency was so large, it
produced lower post-merger prices. A consumer surplus standard, or a requirement that the
benefits of merger be "passed on" to consumers will prohibit many mergers that would oth-
erwise be welfare enhancing.
97. Conceptually, it is similar to analysis already undertaken in assessing alleged pro-
ductive efficiency gains of merger. The primary difference is that courts are assessing and
balancing increases in allocative efficiency (by sanctioning market structures that better
calibrate non-price attributes with the theoretical consumer's willingness to pay) rather than
productive efficiency.
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hospitals' cost savings from reduced non-price competition would
be "passed on" to consumers, potentially in the form of lower
prices. If cost savings were not "passed on," then even a merger
that increased total welfare would be rejected. From this perspec-
tive, debates about the price effects of hospital merger are often
arguments over the distribution of the benefits from reduced non-
price competition, making it difficult to separate discussions of
price and non-price effects in merger cases.
IV. THE PRESUMPTION THAT MARKET POWER
YIELDS HIGHER HOSPITAL PRICES
The transition from the Old to the Emerging Regime has impor-
tant implications for hospital price claims. In the Emerging
Regime, where third-party payors actively negotiate with hospitals
over price, the assumption that market power leads to higher
medical prices is generally defensible , and traditional antitrust
98. See Dranove & Ludwick, supra note 2, at 97 ("[O]ur findings contradict Lynk's con-
clusion that nonprofit mergers are, on average, associated with lower prices. If anything, we
find that nonprofit mergers are associated with higher prices.") (1989 data from California);
Keeler et al., supra note 2, at 71 ("We find strong evidence that the nature of hospital com-
petition has shifted so that price plays a much more significant role. In particular, there has
been a steady increase in the impact of market concentration on hospital pricing behavior.")
(1986-94 data from California); see also David Dranove et al., Price and Concentration in Hospi-
tal Markets: The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payor-Driven Competition, 36J.L. & ECON. 179, 180
(1993) ("We hypothesize that the shift from patient-driven to payer-driven competition will
have two effects on hospital profit margins: it will (1) reduce the margin between prices and
costs and (2) increase the degree to which the relationship between margins and concentra-
tion conforms with the standard I/O [industrial organization] paradigm.... [W]e confirm
our hypotheses about the effects of the shift to payer-driven competition: that is, margins are
falling and increasingly conform with the standard I/O paradigm.") (1983-88 data from
California); Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Effects of Market Structure and Bargaining Position on
Hospital Prices, lJ. HEALTH ECON. 217, 229 (1992) ("Our results indicate that prices paid to
hospitals in the Blue Cross of California PPO network, after controlling for hospital product
differences, are strongly influenced by the competitive structure of the hospital market.
Hospitals located in less competitive markets are able to secure higher prices.") (1987 Blue
Cross of California per-diem price data for medical/surgical services negotiated with hospi-
tals in their PPO network); James C. Robinson & Ciaran S. Phibbs, An Evaluation of Medicaid
Selective Contracting in California, 8J. HEALTH ECON. 437, 453 (1989) ("Hospitals with larger
Medi-Cal patient shares and hospitals in structurally competitive local markets reported
lower rates of cost inflation over the four years following the 1982 reforms [selective con-
tracting] than did otherwise similar hospitals with smaller Medi-Cal shares and fewer local
competitors.") (1982-86 data from California); Jack Zwanziger & Glenn A. Melnick, The
Effects of Hospital Competition and the Medicare PPS Program on Hospital Cost Behavior in Califor-
nia, 7J. HEALTH ECON. 301, 316 (1988) ("The results of our analysis strongly support the
hypothesis that the nature of hospital competition underwent a structural change as a result
of the implementation of California's 'pro-competitive' legislation. As expected, hospitals
competed on a non-price basis before 1983, and, increasingly, on a price basis after 1983.")
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presumptions about the effects of merger are aligned with the
likely economic reality. The relationship between market power
and price for hospitals still mired in the Old Regime, however, is
potentially very different. In these markets, it is theoretically possi-
ble that market power can be associated with lower prices. Courts
and the FTC have reacted to this possibility in dramatically differ-
ent ways. The FTC rejected these claims both as a theoretical
matter and because these claims are inconsistent with the second
step of the Philadelphia formula. 9  The district courts in Carilion and
Butterworth, on the other hand, accepted the hospitals' price claims
as a basis for permitting merger, without necessarily appreciating
the full doctrinal ramifications of their decisions. '00
A. FTC-In re American Medical International, Inc.
In AM!, the hospitals broadly challenged the applicability of the
antitrust laws to hospital mergers, arguing that no price competi-
tion existed in medical markets. For support, they cited the
defining characteristics of the Old Regime: pervasive insurance
coverage, fee-for-service systems of reimbursement, the absence of
consumer price information, and the role of physicians as agents
for patients.' ' The FTC rejected the hospitals' economic argu-
ments, as well as their legal conclusions. First, while recognizing
certain unique aspects of medical markets, the Commission found
that these market failures dampened, but did not eliminate, price
competition. According to Commissioner Calvani, some degree of
hospital price competition "exists among hospitals in various
'attenuated' forms that warrant protection from the antitrust
laws.' 02 Second, the FTC cited evidence in the record of actual
price competition between the pre-merged hospitals. "The record
also documents AMI's acknowledgment that, in the abstract, com-
petition among hospitals constrains their ability to raise rates and
that, in practice, price competition between hospitals in San Luis
Obispo County did constrain hospital charges.' '0 3 The Commission
(1980-85 data from California). For a review of some of this literature, see Pautler & Vita,
supra note 1, at 129-32. As indicated in the parentheticals, almost all of these studies exam-
ine the effects of reforms in California. These studies are indicative of the likely effects of
competition in the Emerging Regime. Not all markets, however, fall into this category.
99. See infra Part IV.A (discussing AMi).
100. See infta Part IV.B-C (discussing Carilion and Butterworth respectively).
101. See In reAmerican Med. Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984).
102. Id. at 179.
103. Id. at 180.
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further held that the merger had the actual effect of decreasing
price competition. "AMI's acquisition of French Hospital has al-
ready lessened price competition and is likely to continue to lessen
price competition, to the extent that any price competition re-
m ain s. "4
Finally, the Commission held that even if no price competition
existed, the antitrust laws would still apply and be strictly en-
forced. 0 5 In essence, AMI was arguing that the absence of
traditional forms of price competition created a de facto exception
from the antitrust laws for hospital mergers.'06 Suggesting that the
law imposed certain binding constraints on the FTC's decision-
making ability, Calvani concluded that "it is the role of Congress,
not the Commission, to legislate exemptions from the antitrust
laws."'0 7 Here, the Commission implicitly confronted the second
step of the Philadelphia formula, the assumption that market power
presumptively causes undesirable (and hence illegal) anticompeti-
tive effects and deferred to Congress, illustrating the channeling
function that these rules can serve.
AMI rephrased its price claims in terms of a direct attack on
Philadelphia's market-share rule:
AMI's contention [is] that Judge Barnes erred in relying on
indices based on market shares in determining the competi-
tive effects of the acquisition. AMI argues that the traditional
presumption that a substantial increase in market concentra-
tion or in a firm's market share results in a lessening of
competition, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank... is not applicable in the
health care industry because the economic assumptions on
which this presumption is based (which AMI argues are pres-
ent in "manufacturing and related industries") are not
present in this industry.
0
The FTC rejected the argument citing both its earlier findings of
the presence of actual price competition in the San Luis Obispo
market and noting numerous incidents in which courts had ap-
plied market-share presumptions in non-manufacturing contexts,
including, ironically, the banking industry at issue in Philadelphia.'09
104. Id. at 202.
105. See id. at 180.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 198.
109. See id. at 198-99.
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Consistent with the analysis in AM!, the F-C in HCA" ° and the dis-
trict court in Rockford Memorialt " proceeded to invoke the
Philadelphia framework and to evaluate the competitive effects of
hospital mergers without paying significant attention to the non-
manufacturing setting in which the mergers were taking place.'
B. Carilion District Court
The pricing analysis of the district court in Carilion13 contrasts
sharply with the FTC's analysis in AM!. Carilion involved the merger
of two nonprofit hospitals in Roanoke, Virginia. In assessing the
likely competitive effects of the merger, the court came to a sur-
prising conclusion. The court held that hospital market power
leads to lower medical prices."14 "Based on expert testimony, the
court also finds that as a general rule hospital rates are lower, the fewer
the number of hospitals in the area.""5 This statement turns upside
down the traditional assumption that economic concentration
produces higher prices. Based in part on this finding, the court
concluded that the merger did not violate the antitrust laws." 6
In all likelihood, the Carilion court's statement reflected a mis-
understanding of the expert testimony presented at trial. The
hospitals' expert witness, Dr. Eisenstadt, did not testify that there
was a negative correlation between market power and hospital
prices, but rather, that there was no statistically significant relation-
ship between economic concentration and price levels." 7 It was this
more limited claim, and not the district court's finding, that the
defendants briefed on appeal. "The hospitals' economic expert,
Dr. Eisenstadt, described studies he had performed in connection
with other nonprofit hospital mergers showing no evidence of
110. In reHospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1982).
111. United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (1989).
112. See id. at 1279 (citing Philadelphia and examining the competitive effects of merger
in light of market-share presumptions); Hospital Corp., 106 F.T.C. at 488 (calculating market-
shares and citing Philadelphia to support the inference of anticompetitive effects from high
levels of economic concentration).
113. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 846-49 (W.D.Va. 1989).
114. See id. at 846.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. See id. at 849.
117. This more limited version of the testimony is consistent with the finding of Eisen-
stadt's contemporaneous research. See David M. Eisenstadt & Robert T. Masson, Price Effects
from Recent Nonprofit Hospital Mergers (presented at the American Public Health Association
Meeting, Chicago, Il.) (Oct. 23, 1989).
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higher prices in areas with fewer hospitals.""" The brief continues,
"there was no significant relationship between the rate of price in-
creases in areas which experienced mergers and in comparable
areas that did not experience mergers ....
Many aspects of the Carilion opinion suggest that the court was
predisposed to approve the merger regardless of its likely price ef-
fects. The court rejected the jury's finding that the relevant
geographic market was limited to the Roanoke Valley, in favor of
the court's own more broadly defined market-directly undermin-
ing the Philadelphia market-share presumption. 2 ° The court
accepted the hospitals asserted efficiencies, failing to distinguish
those lower costs that might be attributed to increased productive
efficiency from those associated with decreased non-price competi-
tion.12 ' Finally, the court determined that the nonprofit status of
the hospitals and their pro-competitive intentions were factors
weighing in favor of the merger's legality. 2  While careful not to
cross the line and engage in express forms of extra-economic bal-
ancing, the court made it clear that it did not believe that market
power in the nonprofit hospital industry represented a serious so-
cial concern, regardless of the predictions of traditional antitrust
and economic theory.
C. Butterworth District Court
The most comprehensive challenge to the presumption
that market power leads to higher prices was mounted by the de-
fendant hospitals in Butterworth. 23 Significantly, the district court
found that the merger of the two largest hospitals in Grand Rapids,
118. Brief for Appellees at 30, United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th
Cir. 1989) (No. 89-2625).
119. Id. at 31. From an econometrics perspective, the Eisenstadt study is subject to criti-
cisms pertaining to the construction of the non-merger control clusters, the short time
period allowed for post-merger price effects to develop, and the failure to consider possible
effects of merger on non-price attributes of hospital services. See Hammer, Mergers, Market
Power & Competition, supra note 1, at 16-20. Aside from these criticisms, the study is gener-
ally consistent with this Article's characterizations of hospital competition in the Old
Regime. Price competition simply does not play a dominant role and market structure does
not appear to make a systematic difference in non-quality-adjusted prices.
120. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 848.
121. See id. at 845-46.
122. See id. at 849.
123. FTC v. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1295-1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd without
op., 121 F.3d 708, reported in ful 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,863 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Michigan would produce market power.1 4 Moreover, the court re-
jected arguments that such market power could not be exercised,
finding substantial barriers to entry.125 In terms of the decision tree
in Figure One, this placed the court on the third node
(balancing). Recognizing that market power both existed and
could be exercised, the only option left to the parties was to mount
a direct challenge to the second step of the Philadelphia formula
and to persuade the court to balance the potential benefits of
merger against any anticompetitive effects. The court entertained
and was ultimately persuaded by these arguments. In reaching its
conclusion, the court examined empirical evidence challenging
the relationship between market power and price, 6 the hospitals'
Community Commitment Letter declaring the defendants' intent
not to use their market power for anticompetitive ends,' and the
community-based nature of the hospitals' board. Each of these
contentions will be considered in turn.
1. Market Power and Price-Economic Testimony--"[D]efendants
contend that empirical proof does not support the presumption
that high concentration of market power among nonprofit hospi-
tals results in price increases. ' 129 Dr. William Lynk testified as the
hospitals' expert. The court favorably reported the findings of
Lynk's examination of the pricing practices of for-profit and non-
profit California hospitals. "'Relative to for-profit hospitals, private
nonprofit hospitals in this sample have a significantly lower associa-
tion between higher market shares and higher prices, and on
balance increased nonprofit market share is associated with lower,
not higher, prices."' 1 30 Based upon this and other related evidence,
124. See id. at 1294 ("Therefore, the Court concludes the FTC has established its prima
facie case that the proposed merger would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. The FTC has statis-
tically demonstrated that the proposed merger would result in a significant increase in the
concentration of power in two relevant markets, and produce an entity controlling an undue
percentage share of each of those markets.").
125. See id. at 1298 ("[Tjhe Court finds that, due to the greater range of services ...
available at defendant hospitals, St. Mary's and Metropolitan's ability to compete with the
merged entity and defeat a small but significant price increase would be limited, especially
for the foreseeable future.").
126. See id. at 1295-96.
127. See id. at 1298.
128. See id. at 1296-97.
129. Id. at 1295.
130. Id. (quoting William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market
Power, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 437, 459 (1995)). The results of Lynk's 1995 study have been ques-
tioned by other researchers. Dranove and Ludwick argue that Lynk's econometrics
specification suffers from both a simultaneity and omitted variables bias. See Dranove &
Ludwick, supra note 2, at 88-90. The authors construct a data set similar to the one em-
ployed by Lynk, replicate his findings using an econometrics specification similar to his, and
then assess the effects of nonprofit status and merger under their own specifications that
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the court concluded that the defendants have demonstrated "good
reason to question the applicability of the traditional presumption
that a significant increase in market concentration will lead to
higher prices in connection with the merger of nonprofit hospi-
tals. ' '
The court's finding is juxtaposed with two other facts in the rec-
ord. First, the FTC's expert, Dr. Leffler, demonstrated that Lynk's
Michigan data also established "a positive correlation between
market concentration and profit margins.' '3 2 In other words, non-
profit hospitals in highly concentrated settings both charged less
for their services and yet somehow earned relatively higher
"profits." Second, the entities benefiting the most from lower
prices in the Grand Rapids market were managed care organiza-
tions that had "exercised leverage to obtain discounts."'133 Indeed,
an acknowledged purpose of the merger was to prevent further
discounting to managed care entities. "[D]efendants have made no
secret of their desire, in the event of merger, to level the managed
care organization playing field by establishing standard managed
care rates."34 Part of the hospitals' plan is to "freeze prices to man-
aged care plans at pre-merger levels." 3 5 The price "freeze" was to
take place in an environment of falling prices for managed care
companies.
Butterworth invites further exploration of the relationship be-
tween price and non-price competition in hospital markets. It is
misleading to examine price in isolation. Price comparisons are
address the omitted variables and simultaneity problems. See id. at 91-93. Under the newly
specified equations, Dranove and Ludwick report that nonprofit status and merger are no
longer associated with lower prices, and that, if anything, "nonprofit mergers are associated
with higher prices." Id. at 97. Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger attempt to assess the robustness
of Lynk's finding over time. See Keeler et al., supra note 2, at 72. Lynk employed 1989 data
from California. Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger try to examine the effects of nonprofit
status and merger on California hospitals over the 1986 to 1994 period. See id. at 72. The
authors also seek to test whether the role of price and non-price competition changed over
the period. The researchers found that a projected merger of two nonprofit hospitals in
1986 would be associated with no significant change in price. See id. at 81 tbl.4. In 1989, the
same nonprofit merger would be associated with a 2.8% increase in price (in contrast with
Lynk's estimated 4.1% price decrease). See id. By 1994, the same nonprofit merger would be
associated with a price increase of 7.3%. See id. Lynk responds to these and other criticisms
by stressing that many of his critics' 1989 findings are "in the same ballpark" as his earlier
findings, Lynk & Neumann, supra note 2, at 102, and by arguing that his critics give inade-
quate attention to the potential pricing disparities between for- and nonprofits, which is the
central aspect of his claim. See id. at 100-01.
131. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295.
132. Id. at 1295.
133. Id. at 1299.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1298.
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meaningful only if the characteristics of the underlying commodity
or service are held constant. Low prices, unadjusted for changes in
quality and other non-price considerations, are not necessarily
more beneficial to consumers. Paying less and getting less may or
may not represent a better deal. 36 This is particularly true in the
health care context where non-price considerations such as quality
play an important role and where strong evidence exists demon-
strating that non-price competition is heavily influenced by
changes in market structure. Leffler's finding that hospitals in
highly concentrated markets had relatively higher markups high-
lights the relevance of the interaction between price and non-price
competition. 7 These markups could be higher in the face of lower
prices, only if there was a corresponding lower level of hospital ex-
penditures of even greater magnitude. Consequently, the real issue
remains whether the trade-off between lower prices and reduced
non-price amenities is beneficial to consumers, returning the dis-
cussion to the same question addressed in Part III: is non-price
competition desirable and should mergers that have as their pri-
mary effect reductions in non-price rivaliy be permitted? If Lynk is
correct, then the distributional effects of who benefits from reduc-
tions in non-price competition may be affected by whether the
hospitals are for-profit or nonprofit, but the underlying social pol-
icy questions of whether such mergers increase total welfare, and
whether private markets, hospital boards, district courts, or legisla-
tors should make such allocative decisions remain unanswered.
2. Community Commitment Letter-Next, the court considered the
hospital's Community Commitment Letter. 38 The letter established
the basis of a consent decree entered by the court, over the objec-
tion of the FTC."39 The letter and the decree committed the
hospitals to freeze list prices and managed care discounts for a
three-year period, and placed a ceiling on future price increases up
through the seventh year following merger. 140 The decree also
placed limitations on prospective profit margins, albeit permitting
136. See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns
in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 572-73 (1995) ("Even
product quality has uncertain consequences for consumer welfare. All consumers may agree
that higher quality products are better than lower quality ones. Some consumers, however,
may prefer to consume lower quality goods at lower prices than higher quality goods at
higher prices.").
137. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295.
138. See id. at 1298.
139. See id. at 1303.
140. See id. at 1298.
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quite favorable rates of return."' In entering the consent decree, a
bargain was struck between the hospitals and the court. The nature
of the bargain, however, is subject to different interpretations. The
letter can be seen as a Coasian contract in which the hospitals were
permitted to merge in order to reduce levels of non-price ameni-
ties in exchange for future price concessions. Under this
interpretation, the consent decree constitutes a device through
which the gains of merger could be shared with other segments of
the community."'
Alternatively, the letter can be viewed as a tactic by the hospitals
to strategically influence the direction of future economic change
in the market. Managed care organizations were beginning to
penetrate the Grand Rapids market and were successfully obtain-
ing price concessions. If this trend continued, one would anticipate
a future in which capital expenditures and investments in non-
price attributes would be increasingly dictated by market forces, as
mediated through the aggregate preferences of managed care pa-
tients, rather than hospital administrators or elite community
boards. In the transition from the Old to the Emerging Regime,
hospitals stand to lose not simply in terms of prospective profitabil-
ity, but also in terms of influence and discretion. in
decisionmaking. It may have been rationally within the Grand Rap-
ids hospitals' self-interest to commit to a system of loose, short-term
price controls in order to hedge against long-term structural
changes in the market.
143
Whether the Community Commitment Letter should be viewed
as a welfare-enhancing Coasian bargain or a self-interested effort to
influence the structure of the market depends upon one's underly-
ing assumptions about medical markets and the efficacy of
141. See id.; see also United States v. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 134-
35 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing the effects of an agreement between the hospitals and the
New York State Attorney General and Department of Health to freeze all hospital list prices
for two years, subject to inflationary increases).
142. Assuming that a merger would lead to an increase in total welfare, and assuming
that there were low transaction costs to bargaining, one would expect the hospitals to be
able to reach an agreement with community stakeholders under which the merger would be
permitted and the gains of merger would be divided in some manner between local stake-
holders. It is difficult to tell a completely harmonious story in the Grand Rapids case,
however, in light of the adverse (and uncompensated) effects of merger on managed care
organizations and the opposition of the FTC to the consent decree (an entity ostensibly
acting to safeguard the public interest).
143. Market structure is, in part, determined by the strategic decisions of market par-
ticipants. This highlights the need to be sensitive to dynamic efficiency concerns and the
effects of decisions on the prospective structure of the market. For further discussion of
these issues, see Hammer, Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm, supra note 16, at
37-40.
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competition. At the end of the Butterworth opinion, the district
court's tone shifts dramatically away from arguments made within
an economic paradigm (careful assessments of the effects of mar-
ket power on price) and toward a sharp critique of markets as an
acceptable mechanism for making health care decisions. The
words and subsequent actions of the court reflect a strong bias
against the defining characteristics of the Emerging Regime. The
court characterized managed care discounts as undesirable forms
of "cost-shifting," benefiting "only select groups of consumers, not
consumers as a whole.' The court proceeded to embrace a pro-
fessional or expert paradigm instead of a market paradigm as the
desired means of allocating health care resources. "In the real
world, hospitals are in the business of saving lives, and managed
care organizations are in the business of saving dollars."''
Whether markets are in fact capable of making these decisions
raises complicated economic and social questions. It is clear, how-
ever, that antitrust laws generally assume that markets can make
these decisions and expressly favor markets as the preferred means
of allocating social resources.'4 In permitting the Grand Rapids
merger, the court failed to acknowledge the importance of this
underlying assumption and failed to distinguish those aspects of
the Philadelphia presumptions that are rebuttable under existing
doctrine from those aspects that are not. 47 The court essentially
144. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1300.
145. Id. at 1302.
146. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
147. It is unfortunate that appellate courts affirmed the controversial district court
opinions in Carilion and Butterworth in unpublished opinions. In affirning the district court
in Carilion, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court judge's determinations were not
clearly erroneous. See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., No.89-2625, 1989 WL 157282 at
*2-3 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989) (holding that the district court's definition of the relevant
product and geographic market, and the district court's assessment of the effect of the
merger on competition were not clearly erroneous). Given the structure of the lower courts
opinion and its efforts to couch its decision in terms of an expanded market definition and
findings of low entry barriers, this was not an unfair disposition. Rebutting the first step of
the Philadelphia formula implicates complicated factual questions. The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, was simply mistaken to view the issues presented on appeal as predominantly ones of
fact rather than ones of law. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 1997-2 Trade Cases
I (CCH) 71,863, 80,063 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The record presented here does not leave us with
a firm conviction that the district court erred in its analysis of the facts."). The only legal
issue perceived by the court was the hospital's efficiency defense. "The FTC argues that the
district court committed legal error by allowing the hospitals to rebut the FTC's prima facie
case with evidence that the merger would give rise to consumer savings." Id. at 80,064. The
district court's consideration of econometric testimony, the nonprofit status of the hospitals,
the Community Commitment Letter, and the community-based structure of the board, how-
ever, goes substantially beyond the efficiency considerations recognized by other circuits.
Moreover, while "a direct examination of consumer welfare is an appropriate form of § 7
analysis," id., the Butterworth district court's actions transcend acceptable forms of intra-
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bootstrapped the rebuttability of the first step of the Philadelphia
presumption (legitimate inquiries into whether market power ex-
ists and whether it can be exercised) into a "frontal assault" on the
assumed efficiency of markets generally, an outcome expressly dis-
approved of by the Court in Professional Engineers.141 Moreover, the
court failed to consider the effects of the hospitals' merger on pos-
sible dynamic efficiency concerns and the future composition of
the Grand Rapids market. As a practical matter, the effect of the
Butterworth decision will be to further entrench the characteristics
of the Old Regime, and to substantially impede the ability of the
market to transition to the Emerging Regime, a transition that
otherwise not only seemed plausible, but imminent.
3. Nonprofit Community Boards-The third consideration relied
upon by the court to justify merger was the community-based na-
ture of the hospitals' board.149 Market power can be defined in
terms of the discretion that private actors have over price-the cli-
ch6 that monopolists are "price makers" rather than "price takers."
The existence of discretion, however, says little about the manner
in which such discretion will be exercised. Traditional economic
assumptions suggest that private discretion will be exercised in a
manner that maximizes producer profits. Theoretically, that same
discretion could be exercised in furtherance of other objectives-
maximization of output, cross-subsidies for underserved segments
of the population, making physician stakeholders happy, or maxi-
mizing the utility of hospital administrators. The hospitals in
Butterworth argued that any discretion created by market power
would be controlled by the merged hospital's board and exercised
in the interests of the community. "iT]he boards of the merging
hospitals are comprised of community business leaders who have a
direct stake in maintaining high quality, low cost hospital serv-
ices."" 0 Defendants proceeded to draw an analogy to consumer
cooperatives, asserting that any market power possessed by the
merging hospitals would be exercised to the benefit of consum-
15)
ers.
economic balancing, and cross the line into forms of extra-economic analysis, which does
raise important legal questions.
148. See National Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
149. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97.
150. Id. at 1296.
151. See id. Other courts have made similar arguments. See United States v. Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 145-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (relying upon the nonprofit
status of the board and its ability to funnel any hospital profits back to the community); FTC
v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222-23 (relying on the community-based structure of
the board and making a comparison between the board and consumer cooperatives);
United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989) ("Defendants'
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The legal significance of the community-based structure of a
hospital's board depends upon which aspect of the Philadelphia
formula is being called into question. Three distinct claims could
be made. First, the community-based board could be relevant if
one believed that community boards made substantively different
(and better) allocative decisions than competitive markets. This
challenges the heart of the second step of the Philadelphia formula
and the presumed efficiency of competitive markets. Second, the
community-based structure of the board may be relevant in deter-
mining whether market power can or will be exercised. Here, the
claim is not that the board will make substantively different deci-
sions than those dictated by the market, but rather that the board
can effectively duplicate competitive market outcomes and resist
temptations to abuse market power by raising prices above mar-
ginal costs. Finally, the community-based nature of the board may
be a factor in determining whether savings from the merger, either
in terms of increased productive efficiency or reductions in non-
price competition, will be passed on to consumers.152 Here, the
community-based nature of the board may affect the distributional
effects of merger, which would be relevant under a consumer sur-
plus standard of review.
Under existing doctrine, the first claim runs afoul of the second
step of the Philadelphia formula and the Court's admonishment in
Professional Engineers. It inappropriately adopts a non-market
mechanism for making decisions concerning the allocation of eco-
nomic resources. The second claim, the assertion that a
community board is a relevant factor in proving that acknowledged
market power will not be exercised, raises an interesting question.
The problem with the argument, however, is that the composition
of the board is not a structurally self-enforcing characteristic. An
analogy to entry barriers is instructive. Entry arguments seek to
demonstrate that any exercise of market power would invite com-
petitive entry, which would foil efforts to raise prices. Entry is an
automatic response, arising solely from opportunistic self-interest.
A similar analysis would ask what aspects of a community board
would automatically frustrate the exercise of market power by the
merged hospital. Butterworth draws a comparison to consumer co-
operatives, but a community board is not a consumer cooperative.
boards of directors both include business leaders who can be expected to demand that the
institutions use the savings achieved through the merger to reduce hospital charges, which
are paid in many cases by employers, either directly or though insurance carriers.").
152. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 846 ("Defendants' boards of directors could be ex-
pected to help insure that savings realized from the affiliation will be passed on to
consumers.").
[VOL. 32:4
Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions
Patients at the hospital have no direct voice in hospital decision
making and have no means of challenging the implementation of
supracompetitive prices.'53 In the absence of an effective, self-
enforcing mechanism to check the exercise of market power, non-
profit status or the community-based nature of the board should be
rejected as a factor capable of demonstrating that post-merger
market power will not be exercised. 154 The district court appears to
have sensed these inadequacies and devised the consent decree as
a means of formalizing and making enforceable the community
board's alleged altruistic instincts. Antitrust law, however, generally
dictates competition and not court-ordered price regulation as the
appropriate response to private market power. The third claim,
that the community board ensures cost savings will be "passed on"
to consumers in the form of lower prices, suffers from the same
structural and self-policing problems as the second claim. If the
community-based board will ensure that cost savings inure to the
benefit of consumers, such a result is more by accident than inher-
ent design.
55
D. Summary
What lessons can be drawn from the cases addressing the price
effects of hospital mergers? There are a number of possible rela-
tionships between price and market power in the Old Regime.
153. The status of some board members as large local employers makes the consumer
cooperative analogy more persuasive, but these incentives are derivative and one step re-
moved. Moreover, there are potential conflicts between a board member's ability to
vigorously pursue the self-interest of her company and her fiduciary duties to the hospital as
a member of the board.
154. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
("Accordingly, the court finds that the defendants' 'consumer-aligned' boards and not-for-
profit status will not necessarily prevent the defendants from engaging in anti-competitive
activity."). The court in Mercy Health Services came to a similar conclusion. "[I]f there is the
potential for anticompetitive behavior, there is nothing inherent in the structure of the
corporate board or the non-profit status of the hospitals which would operate to stop any
anticompetitive behavior." United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 989
(N.D. Iowa 1995). Mercy Health Services is a religious, nonprofit, regional hospital chain,
rather than a free-standing hospital, but the merger was structured to maintain meaningful
local control.
155. It is worth contrasting the deference the court suggests giving community boards
with the state action doctrine. Private actors will be extended antitrust immunity if there is a
clearly articulated state policy to displace competition with regulation, and the actions of the
private parties are actively supervised by the state. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). There is no equivalent of active state supervision
for the private hospital boards.
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Market power may decrease hospital prices (the district court's
finding in Carilion and the expert testimony in Butterworth), market
power may have no statistically significant effect on hospital prices
(Eisenstadt's testimony in Carilion and the defendants' argument
in AMi), or market power could increase hospital prices
(Commissioner Calvani's holding in AM). The district court's
finding in Carilion and Lynk's testimony in Butterworth are theoreti-
cally defensible, but the validity of the contention depends
ultimately upon the interaction between price and non-price com-
petition. For mergers to produce lower prices, there must be a
substantial reduction in non-price competition, as well as an active
mechanism to translate lower hospital costs into lower prices for
patients. No such price mechanism exists in the Old Regime for
the same reasons that there is no effective price competition in the
first place.156 If the Carilion court's theory were universally valid,
then the Eisenstadt study (and others like it) would have produced
a statistically significant negative relationship between market
power and price. While Lynk's work points in that direction, most
of the evidence in the Old Regime suggests that there is simply no
systematic relationship between market power and lower price.
Even the district court in Butterworth, which was quite sympathetic
to the pro-consumer possibilities of community hospital boards,
required the signing of a consent decree to make the hospitals'
commitment to lower prices legally binding.
When hospitals are mired in the institutional arrangements of
the Old Regime, the most defensible proposition is that price
competition is simply not the primary concern. Limited price
competition may take place, but it is "attenuated" at best and the
effect of economic concentration on hospital price levels unad-
justed for non-price differences is generally not statistically significant.
Consequently, attention in the Old Regime should focus on the
effects of merger and economic concentration on non-price compe-
tition, and ultimately upon the social value of the resulting non-price
attributes. Even the price-oriented focus of Lynk and Butterworth is
implicitly about the ability of nonprofit hospitals to translate the
lower costs associated with reduced non-price competition into
actual price reductions for consumers.
156. Calvani made essentially this same argument when he determined that various effi-
ciency gains advocated by the hospitals would not inure to the benefit of health care
consumers. Even if the merger resulted in lower costs (due to increased productive effi-
ciency), those lower costs would not translate in to lower health care prices. See In re
American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 219-20 (1984).
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V. QUESTIONING TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST PRESUMPTIONS
As is frequently the case, economic theory postulates a possibly
straightforward solution to the problems raised by hospital merg-
ers: courts should balance the effects of mergers on producer and
consumer surplus and employ a total welfare standard of merger
review. Judges, litigants, and commentators, however, have been
slow to recognize the simultaneous and potentially conflicting ef-
fects of hospital mergers on the providers and consumers of health
care services. As a result, courts have reached conflicting and ap-
parently irreconcilable results. Courts that focus on the potential
for mergers to reduce medical expenses tend to mischaracterize
these savings as "efficiency" gains and to view mergers favorably,
without recognizing that the cost savings come at the price of re-
ductions in consumer surplus. Conversely, courts that focus on the
impact of merger on non-price competition and the corresponding
negative effects on consumers tend to view mergers unfavorably,
either without recognizing the potential gain to hospitals (and so-
ciety at large) of reduced medical expenses or, if recognizing such
cost savings, without giving such savings any legal weight.
Courts have difficulty addressing the problem of non-price com-
petition because it requires questioning the unquestionable. The
argument that a reduction in non-price competition is beneficial is
a thinly veiled claim that competitive markets fail and that market
power may produce a superior distribution of social resources.
Phrased as such, the argument seeks to rebut the second step of
the Philadelphia formula and borders on mounting a "frontal as-
sault" on the basic policy of the nation's antitrust laws. The claim is
not that the merged entity will not posses market power, nor that
such market power could not be exercised (recognized arguments
rebutting the first step of the Philadelphia formula), but rather that
the market power resulting from the merger is desirable. The ar-
gument can be viewed as a "second best" argument in favor of
increased market power. Second best analysis recognizes that while
mergers reduce competition and create market power, the re-
duced competition may be beneficial, even if it decreases
consumer surplus. Not surprisingly, none of the litigants in the
hospital merger cases have made this claim expressly, and it is
doubtful that contemporary antitrust law would respond sympa-
thetically if they did.
In some respects, the unwillingness of antitrust law to critically
examine the economic effects of market power is paradoxical. The
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courts' role in interpreting and enforcing the antitrust laws has
changed substantially over the hundred-year history of the Sher-
man Act. Few other statutes have afforded judges as much
discretion in decision making. Still, courts have always been of at
least two minds.'57 One mind contends that the judiciary will not
question the underlying economic and policy assumptions of anti-
trust laws, giving a prominent role to presumptions and categorical
rules. The other mind suggests a willingness to examine the eco-
nomic effects of alleged restraints of trade on a case-by-case basis,
focusing upon the actual economic effects of the challenged busi-
ness conduct. Even a cursory examination of contemporary
antitrust jurisprudence reveals that the Court's commitment to
categorical rules is, at best, selectively invoked. Moreover, the
Court's application of categorical rules is heavily dependent upon
how the Court decides to characterize the underlying legal and
economic issues. 58 Growth of rule of reason analysis, increased sen-
sitivity to the consequences of various market failures, and a
growing range of acceptable procompetitive justifications establish
an important current in antitrust law running directly counter to
the rigid application of categorical rules. 59 The widespread accep-
tance by the enforcement agencies and the lower courts of an
efficiency defense under section 7 of the Clayton Act represents
157. Thomas Arthur goes one step further and draws an analogy between contemporary
antitrust doctrine and the multiple personalities in The Three Faces of Eve. See Thomas C.
Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV 263,
309 (1986). The first face is that of a court faithfully interpreting a congressional statute.
The second face is the court as an economic regulatory commission. The third face is of the
court as a creator or giver of law. See id. at 309-10.
158. Compare, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)
(declaring per se illegal the territorial divisions underlying the efforts of small independent
grocers to market their own private label brand), with NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 100-04 (1984) (holding that the NCAA's collectively bargained television contract,
which limited the aggregate number of games broadcast and prohibited member schools
from independently marketing their own games must be examined under the rule of rea-
son). Compare also Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. at 342-55 (holding efforts by
physicians to collectively negotiate terms and rates with third-party payors to be a per se ille-
gal price fixing conspiracy), with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979)
(holding that the joint efforts of composers to negotiate blanket licenses was price fixing
only in a "literal" sense and would be evaluated under the rule of reason).
159. Part of this trend can be attributed to the increased role of economics in antitrust
decision making, leading the Court to revise its understanding of the law and the persuasive
power of its own precedents. "In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well
represented in this Court's decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances
and the lessons of accumulated experience." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)
(overruling the per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing announced in Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)). "Accordingly, this Court has reconsidered its decisions
construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are
called into serious question." Khan, 552 U.S. at 21.
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another important development. The efficiency defense permits
the benefits of increased productive efficiency to be balanced
against losses in allocative efficiency due to the increased market
power. A natural but significant evolutionary step in this process
would be to recognize a broader range of welfare-enhancing effects
of market power in the face of identifiable market failures.
Any attempt to convince courts to openly question the effects of
market power must contend with the pragmatic value that pre-
sumptions have in judicial decision making.16 Economic principles
are useful precisely because they serve as a basis to generalize be-
havior. Courts are often unwilling to make exceptions to bright
line rules. Part of this reluctance stems from the difficulties associ-
ated with arriving at definitive conclusions once clear
presumptions are abandoned. 16' The contention that courts should
be open to a theoretical and empirical examination of the second
step of the Philadelphia formula, however, need not render the un-
derlying presumptions triggered by market-share thresholds
meaningless. Concerns associated with the potential intractability
of the analysis could be addressed by maintaining a strong pre-
sumption of anticompetitive effects (based upon a demonstration
of market power) and by imposing a heightened evidentiary stan-
dard (clear and convincing evidence) for rebutting that
presumption. These standards track the initial restrictions placed
on the efficiency defense under the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
6 2
The extent to which antitrust presumptions can or should be re-
buttable raises difficult questions: are the presumption at issue
statutorily mandated?; do courts have the administrative competence
to address the underlying economic questions on a case-by-case
basis?; and is it the proper institutional role for the judiciary to do
so? Traditional doctrinalists, Chicago School law and economics
160. Strict adherence to the presumption that market power leads to anticompetitive
effects is not surprising. Judicial decision making is itself an exercise in constrained maximi-
zation. Judges make decisions subject to the constraints of the law, their institutional role,
and their administrative capabilities. As such,judges must be sensitive to the utility of heuris-
tic guidelines and the "economies" derived from categorical rules.
161. Categorical rules permit courts to avoid "the necessity for an incredibly compli-
cated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved.., an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Consistently applied rules and presumptions also send
clearer signals to the public and business community. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers,
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
162. See U.S. Dep't of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. 13,103, § 3.5 (CCH
1988) ("Some mergers that the Department otherwise might challenge may be reasonably
necessary to achieve significant net efficiencies. If the parties to the merger establish by clear
and convincing evidence that a merger will achieve such efficiencies, the Department will
consider those efficiencies in deciding whether to challenge the merger.").
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advocates and post-Chicago School theorists would give different
answers to these questions. In slightly caricatured form, doctrinalists
would tend to believe that presumptions in favor of competition and
against market power have a statutory basis and that exceptions to
such rules should be legislated by Congress and not enacted by the
courts. Chicago School theorists temper a belief that antitrust law
should be guided by principles of efficiency with a dim view of the
administrative capacity of courts. Simple rules based on simple mod-
els are desired. Strong and potentially irrebuttable presumptions
play an important role in this framework. 6 3 Post-Chicago School
theorists combine frequently more complicated economic models
with an optimistic belief in the administrative capacity and compe-
tence of the courts. As a result, they are often more willing to cast
aside traditional presumptions and encourage ad hoc problem
solving by the courts.
I believe that antitrust law has so long and so thoroughly com-
mitted itself to a model of common law adjudication, that
arguments raising a statutory bar to economic-based arguments
challenging presumptions based upon market power are no longer
credible. 64 Economic efficiency is the touchstone of antitrust
analysis and efficiency concerns should lead courts, in appropriate
circumstances, to question the effects of market power in the pres-
ence of other identifiable market failures. Market failures lie at the
core of the problems raised by hospital mergers. When market
failures are present, antitrust courts should acknowledge their exis-
tence in assessing the competitive effects of merger. These
assessments are not always easy. As a result, the presumption de-
bate should ultimately turn on an assessment of the capacity of the
courts to administer such a broad-ranging economic inquiry and
the comparative institutional wisdom of permitting courts (as op-
posed to legislative of administrative bodies) to undertake such an
analysis. While the underlying economic issues are complicated,
they are not intrinsically more complicated than the issues that are
confronted already in antitrust rule of reason analysis.
163. Skepticism about the administrative capabilities of the courts leads the efficiency-
minded advocates of the Chicago school to reject an efficiency defense in merger cases. See
BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 91, at 124-29 (citing the difficulties involved in
measuring efficiencies and litigating efficiency claims as a reason for rejecting the defense);
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 94, at 112 (citing measuring difficulties as a justifica-
tion for rejecting an efficiency defense).
164. See Kahn, 552 U.S. at 20-21 ("Thus, the general presumption that legislative
changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of
the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.'") (citation omitted).
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The hospital merger cases illustrate important limitations in cur-
rent antitrust doctrine. What is called for is either a renewed
respect for the role of rigid presumptions in antitrust law and a
corresponding deference to the legislature (with acknowledged
costs in terms of the type one errors associated with such categori-
cal rules) or the development of a more complete framework that
would permitjudicial resolution of challenges to the second step of
the Philadelphia formula by expressly balancing economic argu-
ments in favor of market power against acknowledged
anticompetitive effects. Appropriate respect for the administrative
utility and implicit channeling function of market-share presump-
tions could be maintained within a regime of intra-economic
balancing outlined in Part II. The tools and methods of modern
welfare economics provide a framework in which to litigate and
judicially assess the effects of non-price competition in the Old Re-
gime. Maintaining a sharp distinction between forms of intra-
economic analysis and extra-economic analysis creates a workable
division of labor between judges and legislators, while permitting a
more satisfactory resolution of the issues raised by hospital mergers
than has been achieved to date.
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